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THE EXXON VALDEZ REOPENER:
NATURAL RESOURCES DAMAGE
SETTLEMENTS AND ROADS NOT
TAKEN
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.* WITH
J.B. CROSETTO III, C.A. HOLLEY,
T.C. KADE, J.H. KAUFMAN,
C.M. KOSTELEC, K.A. MICHAEL,
R.J. SANDBERG & J.L. SCHORR
The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill caused extensive natural resource
damage to the Prince William Sound. Lawsuits addressing this
natural resource damage resulted in a settlement that required
Exxon to pay $900 million over time to trustees charged with
spending this money to restore the damaged environment of the
Sound and nearby areas. The settlement included a “Reopener
Clause,” which pledges Exxon to spend an additional $100 million
to fund restoration or rehabilitation of resources whose injuries
were not foreseeable in 1989. This Article urges the State of
Alaska and the United States to seek enforcement of the Reopener
Clause, to restore natural resources and Native subsistence uses
that were not addressed in the initial settlement and have not recovered from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Alternatively, this Article urges Native entities to intervene in the case and seek enforcement of the Reopener Clause.

Copyright © 2005 William H. Rodgers, Jr., J.B. Crosetto III, C.A. Holley, T.C.
Kade, J.H. Kaufman, C.M. Kostelec, K.A. Michael, R.J. Sandberg, and J.L.
Schorr.
This Article is also available on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/alr.
* Stimson Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washington. Professor Rodgers teaches environmental law, law and biology, and oceans
and coastal law. His research interests include the subjects of law, biology, human
behavior, and environmental law in Indian country. This Article was written in
conjunction with the Winter 2005 Seminar on Natural Resource Damages at the
University of Washington, School of Law.
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This was the largest oil spill ever to have occurred in U.S. waters
1
and the largest anywhere this far north.

I. INTRODUCTION
Prince William Sound, Alaska, lost its innocence in March of
1989 when the tanker Exxon Valdez went aground on Bligh Reef.
This terrible spill killed more birds, contaminated more shoreline,
covered more water, spawned more lawsuits, and ruined more lives
2
than any oil spill in the history of this continent.
The spill was so big that experts cannot agree on its volume,
though it was clearly the largest spill in the United States. Exxon’s
figure, 10.8 million gallons, ranks it Number 34 in the “Top 65
Spills Worldwide,” but more recent calculations—up to 30 million
3
gallons—would bump it to Number 15 on the list. The spill’s geographic reach is more obvious: oil reached to the far corners of
4
Prince William Sound and way down the Alaska Peninsula.

1. Symposium, The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaskan
Coastal Environment, 1996 AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y SYMP. 18 (1996) (on file with
author).
2. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ 1,
5 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT] (contaminated 1,244 miles of coastline); see also Robert E. Jenkins & Jill Watry Kastner, Running Aground in a Sea
of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 151, 153, 167 (1999–2000) (250,000 birds killed and
330 lawsuits); Steve Keeva, After the Spill, 77 Feb. A.B.A.J. 66, 66 (1991) (181
separate suits in state and federal courts, over 75 law firms); Miles Tolbert, The
Public as Plaintiff: Public Nuisance and Federal Citizen Suits in the Exxon Valdez
Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 511, 511 n.1 (1990) (within a month the oil
had covered 1,000 square miles of state land and waters and 1,300 claims were
filed).
3. Compare 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 86 (listing top 65 spills)
with RIKI OTT, SOUND TRUTH AND CORPORATE MYTH$: THE LEGACY OF THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 4–5 (2005) (estimating volume of 30 million gallons).
4. OTT, supra note 3, at xx (map displaying spread of oil from Mar. 24, 1989
to June 20, 1989).
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Figure 1. Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, Alaska Oil Spill
Commission Final Report, State of Alaska, February 1990, p. 62.

Despite its extensiveness, the lawsuits addressing the natural
resources damage were settled amicably. On October 8, 1991
Judge H. Russel Holland approved a settlement among Exxon, the
5
United States, and the State of Alaska. The agreement required
Exxon to pay $900 million over time to natural resources “trustees,” identified in the settlement documents as the United States
6
and the State of Alaska. The Trustee Council, composed of three
appointees of the United States and three from Alaska, would

5. [Consolidated] Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon
Corp., Nos. A91-081-083 CV ¶¶ 6, 8 (D. Alaska, Oct. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Oct.
1991 Consent Decree].
6. Id. ¶¶ 8, 6(f).
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spend this money to restore the damaged environment of Prince
William Sound and nearby areas.7
Part of the inducement for this settlement was the so-called
“Reopener clause,” titled in the Agreement and Consent Decree as
a “Reopener for Unknown Injury.” This clause reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, between
September 1, 2002, and September 1, 2006, Exxon shall pay to
the Governments such additional sums as are required for the
performance of restoration projects in Prince William Sound and
other areas affected by the Oil Spill to restore one or more populations, habitats or species which, as a result of the Oil Spill, have
suffered a substantial loss or substantial decline in the areas affected by the Oil Spill; provided, however, that for a restoration
project to qualify for payment under this paragraph the project
must meet the following requirements:
(a) the cost of a restoration project must not be grossly disproportionate to the magnitude of the benefits anticipated from the remediation; and
(b) the injury to the affected population, habitat, or species
could not reasonably have been known nor could it reasonably have been anticipated by any Trustee from any
information in the possession of or reasonably available
8
to any trustee on the Effective Date.

Resort to the Reopener is constrained by a filing requirement:
The Governments shall file with Exxon, 90 days before demanding any payment pursuant to Paragraph 17, detailed plans for all
such restoration projects, together with a statement of all
amounts they claim should be paid under Paragraph 17 and all
information upon which they relied in the preparation of the res9
toration plan and the accompanying cost statement.

The Reopener helped seal the settlement. The governments
told Judge Holland that it was an important hedge against miscalculations or excessive optimism, fueled by the desire to settle
10
quickly. Early in the settlement process, Alaska and the federal

7. The provision also provides for reimbursement of legal costs. Id. ¶ 10; see
also EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL RESTORATION PLAN 5
(Nov. 1994), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/restoration/restoration
plan.pdf [hereinafter RESTORATION PLAN].
8. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 17.
9. Id. ¶ 19.
10. Governments’ Mem. in Support of Agreement and Consent Decree at 12,
United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 CV (D. Alaska 1991), available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/settlement/gov_memo100891.pdf
[hereinafter
1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem.] (applauding the “novel” Reopener provision
and stating strict liability standard: “Exxon commits to pay up to $100 million for
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government announced they were looking for at least $1 billion in
damages.11 Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Administrator William Reilly “insisted” that the agreement contain $300
million in a special compensation fund for additional, later12
discovered damage to natural resources. This demand underlies
the Reopener clause in the final settlement agreement, and was
opposed by Exxon executives from the start—the settlement negotiations nearly ran aground because of Mr. Reilly’s insistence on
13
the Reopener. Exxon and Mr. Reilly compromised on a diminished Reopener, requiring Exxon to pay up to $100 million after
14
2001, if necessary.
This Article urges the State of Alaska and the United States to
seek enforcement of the Reopener clause. To date, neither Alaska
nor the federal government have requested any of the $100 million
Exxon may be required to pay to compensate for additional damages resulting from the oil spill. We offer extended comment on
this most famous of all natural resource damage cases. Special attention will be paid to legal roads not taken.
II. ROADS NOT TAKEN
A. The Third Trustee: A Missing Tribal Presence
1. Natural Resource Damages at Common Law. Modern
natural resource damages (“NRD”) law is rooted in the common
law public trust and parens patriae doctrines. The “public trust”
15
doctrine arose in the 1892 Illinois Central case, and supports the
16
idea that public resources must not be lost. The Alaska Constitution similarly reflects an understanding of the common ownership
17
and stewardship of natural resources.

restoration of unanticipated environmental harm, without any need for the Governments to establish Exxon’s liability.”).
11. Keith Schneider, In Exxon Deal, Transportation Chief Wins Another One
for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A18.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892).
16. See id.
17. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 3 (“[w]herever occurring in their natural
state, fish, wildlife and waters are reserved for the people for common use”); see
also Gregory F. Cook, The Public Trust Doctrine in Alaska, 8 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG.
1, 5 (1993) (arguing that the Alaska Constitution implicitly adopts the public trust
doctrine).
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Parens patriae, “parent of the country,” protects the public
trust by granting states standing to sue as guardians of natural re18
19
sources. A leading case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, recognized a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its environment for its citizens: “[T]he state has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
20
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”
Another powerful underpinning of natural resource protection
21
is the Indian trust doctrine. Because of history, tradition, religion,
and cultural beliefs, the Native voice is often Nature’s voice:
Every part of this soil is sacred . . . Every hillside, every valley,
every plain and grove, has been hallowed by some sad or happy
event in days long vanished. Even the rocks, which seem to be
dumb and dead as they swelter in the sun along the silent shore,
thrill with memories of stirring events connected with lives of my
people, and the very dust upon which you now stand responds
more lovingly to their footsteps than to yours, because it is rich
with the blood of our ancestors
and our bare feet are conscious
22
of the sympathetic touch . . . .

The common law does not isolate who can speak for nature.
There are at least three government voices (federal, state, and
tribal), and sometimes many others. Moreover, nothing in the
common law origins of NRD statutes eschews prevention in favor
of restitution.
2. Federal Natural Resource Damages Statutes. Natural resource damages statutes build on these common law foundations,
authorizing the federal government, states, and Indian tribes to act
as trustees. The main statutes addressing hazardous substance
spills are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa23
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”) and

18. See generally Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment:
Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411 (1970).
19. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
20. Id.
21. Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal
Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Government
Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 368 (2003) (“The Indian trust doctrine is perhaps
the only source of law that can protect the natural landscapes, animals, and waters
that sustain tribalism.”).
22. W.C. VANDERWERTH, INDIAN ORATORY: FAMOUS SPEECHES BY NOTED
INDIAN CHIEFTAINS 121–22 (1971) (statement of Chief Seattle, SuquamishDuwamish Indian).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628 (2000).
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the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).24 The tribal presence is
25
confirmed in each.
Superfund addresses the clean-up of hazardous substances and
26
counts NRD among recoverable response costs. It specifies cleanup responsibilities and techniques. Superfund also makes clear that
sums recovered as NRD by the United States or any state—but not
by a tribe—are available “for use only to restore, replace, or ac27
quire the equivalent” of natural resources.
OPA was a direct Congressional response to the Exxon Valdez
28
spill, and it brought oil under the CERCLA regime. It also de29
fines “natural resources” to include tribal interests, and it unmistakably includes subsistence use among the recoverable elements in
an oil spill damages action: “[d]amages for loss of subsistence use
of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant
who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed,
or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the re30
sources.”
OPA details the extent of liability to NRD trustees, the dam31
ages’ designation, and the damages’ function. Section 1006 requires all three trustees to “develop and implement a plan for the
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the
32
equivalent” of the natural resources under their trusteeship.
3. Tribes Left Out. Notwithstanding Superfund and OPA’s
clear inclusion of Indian interests, tribes were left out of the 1991
settlement because the Exxon Valdez claims were brought under
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2728 (2000).
25. For instance, Superfund defines “natural resources” to include “land, fish,
wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States . . . any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(16) (2000). In contrast, the Clean Water Act lists only federal and state
governments as trustees. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4). For a review of the case law, see
Gordon J. Johnson, Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, OPA and CWA,
SD28 ALI-ABA 333, 338 (1998); Peter M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages
from Rachel Carson’s Perspective: A Rite of Spring in American Environmentalism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1995–96).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000).
27. § 9607(f)(1).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2000).
29. OPA’s definition mirrors CERCLA’s. See § 2701(20).
30. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
31. § 2706.
32. §§ 2706(c)(1)(C), (2)(B), (3)(B).
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the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), whose 1977 amendments use the
older, federal-and-state-only, trustee model.33 Though tribes may
be treated as states, they were not sua sponte brought in by any
34
federal or state plaintiffs. This outcome can be attributed to the
conflict in Alaska over the status of Indian country, tribes, and the
35
United States’ trust duty. In short, despite the tribes’ great interest, none of the settlement parties wanted to include them.
4. Alaska Native Villages and Tribes Hardest Hit.
Never in the millennium 36of our tradition have we thought it possible for the water to die.
As the first oiled birds and otters appeared, “many of the Port
Graham women went down to the beach, even though the
weather was stormy. Going out in a skiff at that evening’s low
tide, they collected the prized and nutritious clam-like ‘bidarkies’
in the fading light. . . . That night they shucked and cleaned the
bidarkies and gave each family in the village
one bagful, knowing
37
these might be the last for years to come.”

The omission of a tribal presence on the Exxon Valdez Trustee
Council was not due to the spill’s chance neglect of village and
tribal resources. Alaska Natives are the largest private landowners

33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4)–(5).
34. The spill was in 1989; in the 1987 CWA amendments, tribes won the right
to be treated as “states” for various water pollution programs. See 33 U.S.C. §
1377(e) (2000). However, this right apparently did not extend to § 1321, the NRD
provisions. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State:
The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 818 (2004).
35. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523–24
(1998) (describing how the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)
extinguished federal supervision over Indian affairs and resolved land claims by
Alaska Natives). Notwithstanding this precedent, commentators recognize a tribal
presence and the existence of a trust duty. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A.
VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 95–98 (2d. ed. 2002) [hereinafter CASE & VOLUCK]. Prior to Venetie’s interpretation of ANCSA, many commentators assumed a trust duty existed. See id. at 111–13 (ed. 1984) (four-part
analysis of trust responsibility discussing Native lands, human services, subsistence, and self-government); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 220–28 (1982 ed.); G. Kevin Jones, Black Gold and the Tlingit Indian Village
of Yakutat, Alaska: A Case Study of Alaska’s Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Resources and the Federal Trust Responsibility to Native Alaskans, 24
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565 (1988).
36. 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at iv (quoting Water Meganinick,
Sr., traditional village chief, Port Graham, in the wake of the spill).
37. Id. at 74–75.
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in Prince William Sound.38 The Chugach Alaska Corporation is
39
“owned” by approximately 2,000 Native shareholders, and within
the region are twenty Native villages, including Chenega Bay, Eng40
lish Bay, Eyak, Port Graham, and Tatitlek.

Figure 2. Map Illustrating the Twenty Communities Affected by
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Courtesy of Dr. Usha Varanashi.

The massive news coverage of the spill mostly overlooked the
Native story, focusing instead on a disaster narrative, turning
quickly to the crimal aspects of the spill, and then emphasizing the
41
environmental impact. By contrast, on the pages of the Tundra
Times, the Native newspaper, ten of ten oil spill stories in April of
1989 emphasized the “subsistence narrative,” i.e., that “the very
42
environment that gave them life could be dying.”

38. Patrick Daley with Dan O’Neill, “Sad is Too Mild a Word”: Press Coverage of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, J. COMM. 42, 42 (1991).
39. Id. at 50.
40. Dr. Usha Varanasi, Science & Research Director, Northwest Fisheries
Science Center, NOAA, Presentation to NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of
Law (Feb. 2005) (on file with author).
41. Daley, supra note 38, at 50 (using ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS and THE
BOSTON GLOBE as mainstream barometers).
42. Id. at 50, 51.
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5. Chenega Bay Settlement. Native groups opposed the 1991
settlement, objecting to the extent to which damage assessment information was made publicly available, the adequacy of compensa43
tion, and the absence of civil penalties. Notably, however, no Native group in 1991 sought or demanded to become party to the federal-state-Exxon settlement. Further, in 1989-1991, no tribes were
federally recognized, and thus they could be overlooked in the legal
44
calculus. One of the most active and effective groups in agitating
against the settlement bowed out with a settlement of its own, in
45
the case of Native Village of Chenega Bay v. United States.
Among other things, this settlement required Native groups to
withdraw and waive any NRD claims arising from the spill, and
stipulated that the federal and state governments could exclude
46
Native groups from acting as trustees.
Although it was not an ideal settlement for Native plaintiffs,
they were assured access to governmental research on spill damage,
which was held confidential in anticipation of a huge NRD lawsuit
47
that was never filed. In addition, the Chenega Bay plaintiffs won
the right to sue for monetary damages for cultural and subsistence
48
losses. However, this right proved worthless. When the Alaska
Natives sued to recover damages for injuries to their “subsistence
way of life,” the Alaska District Court dismissed their claim, holding that Alaska’s general population has a right to pursue a subsis49
tence lifestyle. The Chenega Bay settlement also anticipated that
Native interests would be protected fully by the Trustee Council.
This reliance was mistaken.
These fundamental legal disappointments, in retrospect, are
reasons to look more attentively at the Reopener clause.

43. See 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 24 (listing seven
categories of written objections to the consent decree).
44. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian Country” and the
Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 4–6
(2005).
45. Consent Decree and Stipulation of Dismissal, Native Vill. of Chenega Bay
v. United States, No. A91-454 CV (D. Alaska, Sept. 24, 1991) [hereinafter
Chenega Consent Decree].
46. Id. at ¶ 8.
47. On the conflicts over the “confidential” treatment of early research data,
see OTT, supra note 3, at 206–07.
48. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶¶ 7–9.
49. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1994 WL 182856, at *2 (D. Alaska
Mar. 23, 1994) (“The Alaska Natives do not have a viable, maritime, public nuisance claim, as their claim is only different in degree, but not in kind, from that
suffered by the general population of Alaska.”).
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6. Tribal Intervention to Enforce the Reopener. Would it be
possible at this late date for Alaska tribes to intervene in the NRD
cases, for purposes of enforcing the Reopener? We think so.
This would not be the first attempt. In 1995, the non-profit
Coastal Coalition sought permissive intervention for the purpose of
establishing a post-decree monitor for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
50
(“EVOS”) Trustee Council. The federal government opposed the
motion, arguing that: (1) it was untimely because there was no
“live” case; (2) there was no common question of law or fact as required for permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b); (3) the Coastal Coalition presented no independent
basis for jurisdiction, as required by Rule 24, to review Executive
Branch restoration decisions; and (4) the Coastal Coalition had no
standing to intervene because only third-party beneficiaries have
51
Furnon-party rights to enforce the terms of a consent decree.
thermore, the federal government argued that, where it is party to a
consent decree, it alone, on behalf of the public, may seek en52
forcement of the decree’s provisions.
Though the district court denied the Coastal Coalition’s mo53
tion, it was not a full denial. The court did not address the issue of
standing; rather, the court found it lacked jurisdiction to order the
54
creation of a Review Commission. But the court also held that
the Coalition’s motion was timely filed, a review of the trustees’
activities would not unduly prejudice the parties, and common
questions of law and fact existed between the motions to intervene
55
and the main action. With regard to jurisdiction, the court held
that OPA did not apply but that independent jurisdiction might be
found under Title 28, Section 1367 of the United States Code (sup56
Though the motion was denied, “the
plemental jurisdiction).

50. Mot. to Intervene by Coastal Coalition, United States v. Exxon Corp., No.
A91-082 CV (D. Alaska, Mar. 29, 1995).
51. Opposition of the United States to the Coastal Coalition’s Mot. to Intervene, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 CV, at 3 (D. Alaska, Apr. 18,
1995) [hereinafter Apr. 1995 Opposition Motion].
52. Id. at 12.
53. Order (Mot. to Intervene), United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082
CV, at 9 (D. Alaska, May 17, 1995).
54. Id. at 7. In the Exxon Valdez consent decree, the district court retained
jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. Oct.
1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 38.
55. Order (Mot. to Intervene), United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082
CV, at 6 (D. Alaska, May 17, 1995).
56. Id. at 7.
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court [was] not unsympathetic with the Coastal Coalition’s concerns”57—perhaps the future will hold a more favorable decision.
An Alaskan tribe should be entitled to intervene under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if: (1) the tribe claims an interest
related to settlement, (2) the failure to intervene impairs its ability
to protect that interest, and (3) the interest has not been ade58
quately represented by the federal or state government. These
requirements should be easy to meet. The United States and the
59
State of Alaska have not yet pursued the Reopener, and an intervener need only show that representation on its behalf “may be”
60
inadequate. The tribes were not recognized at the time of the settlement; they have not benefited from direct settlements or EVOS
61
projects. Given the low prima facie inadequacy threshold, tribal
intervention could at least shift the burden to the governments to
prove they adequately represented tribal interests—that the arrangement with Exxon was no sweetheart deal—and that there are
no scientific grounds for invoking the Reopener.
Exxon will surely challenge the timeliness of tribal intervention, but under the circumstances, there could hardly be a more
appropriate time. The timeliness of a motion to intervene “is to be
62
The tribe must then
determined from all the circumstances.”
show why it is not too late, that Exxon and the governments will
not be prejudiced thereby, and that there are legitimate reasons
63
why the tribe did not intervene earlier.
As to the first element, though Exxon has made the last of its
settlement payments, the case may still be pending because the Reopener window has not closed. Since the Reopener provides for
unforeseen damages, and tribes can show such damages are real
and will be relevant for decades to come, there seems to be no
more fitting time to intervene than the present.

57. Id. at 8.
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
59. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Groups Seek to Increase Bill for Exxon Spill, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at B4; Lila Guterman, Slippery Science, 5 CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 24, 2004, at A12.
60. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983).
61. According to the founder and director of the Eyak Preservation Council,
“the government said[,] if you want a restoration program, or if you would like us
to preserve or protect your Native land, you have to sell it to us.” Dune Lankard,
Sacred Places: Indian Rights After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 10 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 375 (1999).
62. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973).
63. See United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004).
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As to the delay, the governments’ inaction as the Reopener
deadline looms makes a compelling argument for granting intervention. The original consent decree is unmistakable in its design
not to affect or impair the “rights and obligations, if any, of Alaska
Native villages to act as trustees for the purposes of asserting and
64
compromising claims” for NRDs resulting from the spill. The
burden was ultimately upon Exxon, the United States, and Alaska
to join additional parties in order to ensure the judgment’s binding
65
effect. With an approaching deadline, no ability to sue directly,
and no sign from the governments of imminent joinder, intervention may be the tribes’ last chance for a day in court.
Additionally, for a motion to intervene to succeed, the tribe
must demonstrate that invoking the Reopener serves tribal interests. This should be simple—tribes could develop (and some have)
a restoration plan worthy of the Reopener opportunity. Alternatively, a tribe could seek representation on the EVOS Council as a
trustee. From there, a tribe might demand, for example, that
money be spent on a study of how to best invest additional Reopener money.
An alternative to intervention is a tribal suit against the
66
United States under the All Writs Act for a mandamus order
compelling enforcement of the consent decree’s terms. When the
conditions for invoking the Reopener are fully met, the government has a duty to invoke it. A line of cases in the Sixth Circuit
confirms judicial authority to enforce a consent decree’s terms
against a non-party, if that party has frustrated the purposes of the
67
decree or the administration of justice. Here, if the federal government refuses to invoke the Reopener, and the Reopener is
deemed necessary to fulfill the settlement goals, its conduct would
frustrate the decree’s purposes. It is not implausible that a nonparty with an interest in the judgment could move the court for enforcement of the decree’s terms, when a party fails to do so.
Finally, we believe the Indian trust doctrine is operative in
Alaska. The federal responsibility towards Indians, according to
the Department of the Interior, “is a legally enforceable fiduciary
obligation, on the part of the United States, to protect tribal lands,
assets, resources, and treaty rights, as well as a duty to carry out the
64. Mem. of Agreement and Consent Decree, IV(C)(1), United States v.
Alaska, A91-081 CV (D. Alaska Oct. 28, 1991).
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
67. See United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 401 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2005) (but specifically preserving this aspect of the holding).
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mandates of federal law with respect to American Indian and
Alaska Native tribes.”68 It is difficult to imagine how any version of
this trust doctrine can be reconciled with a federal decision to leave
ample amounts of oil on the properties and subsistence resources
of Alaska Natives, while neglecting to compel delivery of money
set out to fix the problem.
B. Disapproval of 1991 Settlement
In theory, Judge Holland could have disapproved the 1991 settlement and sent the litigation in a somewhat different direction,
but practically, given the politics and pressures of the spill, this option was not available. In approving settlement, a court weighs
whether the proposal is procedurally and substantively fair, reason69
Within
able, and compatible with underlying statutory goals.
these general contours hide a host of particulars, including whether
the settlement is a product of arms-length negotiations, is reflective
70
of uncertainties and litigation risks, or is convincing on its face.
The Exxon Valdez spill was a legal nightmare, as well as an
ecological and economic disaster. Within hours of the catastrophe,
Exxon was laying the groundwork for multiple assignments of
blame and potential liability for the United States and Alaska, ren71
dering settlement more attractive to these government actors.
Further complicating the situation, baseline data for a pristine
Prince William Sound would never be available (despite heroic ef72
forts to secure it). Thus, pre-litigation science was controversial

68. See Dep’t of Interior, Office of American Indian Trust, American Indians
and Alaska Natives, https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Native/Outreach/
American/indian.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). Others have defined it similarly as
“federal responsibility to protect or enhance tribal assets (including fiscal, natural,
human, and cultural resources) through policy decisions and management
actions.” DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND:
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 65 (2001) (emphasis
added). For another discussion, see Mary C. Wood, Origins and Development of
the Trust Responsibility: Paternalism or Protection?, Address before the Federal
Bar Association 28th Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.
law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/docs/albequerque_trust_speech.pdf.
69. E.g., United States v. Fort James Operating Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 902, 906
(E.D. Wis. 2004).
70. See generally id. at 907–08 (analyzing a CERCLA consent decree).
71. See, e.g., 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–18 (Exxon immediately requested permission to use dispersants but the governments resisted, imposing a formal application requirement).
72. See OTT, supra note 3, at 251–53 (discussing the difficulties of obtaining
baseline data for salmon).
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and replete with competing, possibly misleading, studies.73 There
were no functional rules for calculating NRD. Contingent valuation
studies done on the damage to the Sound varied between $3 billion
74
and $15 billion, but no one, not even federal litigators, had confi75
dence in these estimates.
Rather, conventional wisdom holds that the case was settled
on the back of an envelope in Washington, D.C. As the story goes,
Governor Hickel demanded any settlement have a “B” in it. Potentially massive criminal penalties gave way to four misdemeanors
76
and $25 million in fines. Of the $1.25 billion in civil damages,
fines, and restitution, $125 million was “remitted” and vanished in
an accounting gesture “in consideration” of the work Exxon had
77
done in cleaning up the spill. Another $100 million was declared
“restitution” and went to the federal government and the State of
78
Alaska for “restoration projects” in Alaska. These amounts were
subtracted from the NRD portion of the settlement, leaving the
79
EVOS Trustee Council with $900 million.
The overall settlement was jeopardized by three particulars:
the inadequacy of the criminal law disposition and its encroachment on the NRD fund; the understatement of injuries being forgiven and resolved; and the invention of conditions on the Reopener without basis in law. Only one of these objections was presented fully to Judge Holland.

73. Compare Carrie Gartner, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Case Study in
Institutional Apologia 71–72 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Cal. State Univ.,
Fullerton) (on file with author) (describing interference with collection of dead
birds) with Guterman, supra note 59, at A12 (describing allegations of scientific
fraud). Compare also Charles H. Peterson et al., Sampling Design Begets Conclusions: The Statistical Basis for Detection of Injury to and Recovery of Shoreline
Communities After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 210 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS
SERIES 255, 255–83 (2001) with Edward S. Gilfillan et al., Comment on Sampling
Design Begets Conclusions, 231 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 303, 303–08
(2002).
74. Gardner Brown, Group Meeting with NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch.
of Law (Feb. 2005) (on file with author); see also Michael Parrish, Secret Studies
Put Spill Damage at $15 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al.
75. Brown, supra note 74.
76. Michael Parrish, Exxon Reaches $1.1 Billion Spill Settlement Deal, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at A1.
77. Id. Exxon was called “a good corporate citizen” based on its actions after
the spill. Michael Parrish, Judge Approves $1.125 Billion Oil Spill Settlement, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A1.
78. Parrish, supra note 76, at A1.
79. See id.
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1. The Criminal-Civil Case Confusion. The Exxon Shipping
Company and the Exxon Corporation faced five criminal charges
as a result of the spill. On February 27, 1990, the two entities were
indicted and charged with felony violations of the Ports and Waterways Act and the Dangerous Cargo Act, and with misdemeanor
violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migra80
tory Bird Treaty Act. By including claims under the Refuse and
Migratory Bird Treaty Acts, the government was able to hold
Exxon strictly liable for the spill, in a settlement-encouragement
81
endeavor. In March 1991, Exxon Shipping agreed to plead guilty
to all three misdemeanors, and the Exxon Corporation agreed to
plead to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act misdemeanor. The parties
82
concluded that a $100 million criminal penalty was appropriate.
On April 24, 1991, federal district court Judge H. Russel Hol83
land rejected the $100 million plea agreement as insufficient.
Judge Holland declared the fines an inadequate deterrent: “I’m
afraid these fines send the wrong message, suggesting that spills are
84
a cost of business that can be absorbed.”
Of particular concern was Exxon’s lack of remorse regarding
the impacts of the spill. There was also concern that an approved
settlement might have an adverse impact on the claims of the
85
Alaska Natives. Part of the discovery process was designed to ascertain if Exxon planned to use the government settlement to hin86
der potential claims by Alaska Natives. Exxon Chair Lawrence
Rawl asserted that Exxon did not consider these claims during the
87
settlement process; to shore up settlement negotiations with
Exxon, federal and state authorities negotiated an agreement with
the Chenega Bay plaintiffs and other Native groups whereby the
governments reserved the exclusive right to recover for NRD on
public lands, including those used for subsistence living, and the

80. See Ronald J. Ostrow, Exxon Agrees to Pay $1 Billion for Alaska Spill,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at A1.
81. Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The
Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 148 (1992).
82. See Ostrow, supra note 80, at A1.
83. Patrick Lee, Exxon-Alaska Civil Oil Spill Pact Collapses, L.A. TIMES, May
4, 1991, at A1; Alanna Sullivan et al., Judge Rejects Exxon Alaska-Spill Pact,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1991, at A3.
84. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 183 (quoting Keith Schneider, Judge
Rejects $100 Million Fine for Exxon in Oil Spill as Too Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1991, at A1).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 184.
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Native groups retained the right to pursue their private claims.88
On September 25, 1991, Exxon and the governments signed a new
settlement agreement that was subsequently approved by the
89
Alaska Legislature and accepted by Judge Holland.
The approved settlement was strikingly similar to the earlier
90
proposal, which was rejected as inadequate. This time, Judge Holland commended Exxon for its efforts, calling Exxon a “good cor91
porate citizen.” The settlement included $150 million in fines,
with $100 million for restitution to be split between the state and
92
federal governments. However, Exxon paid only $25 million in
fines to the North American Wetlands Conservation and the Vic93
tim Compensation and Assistance Act accounts. In consideration
of Exxon’s cooperation in the clean-up, the court forgave $125 mil94
lion in criminal fines. Concurrently, the district court approved a
civil settlement where Exxon would pay $900 million over ten
years, plus an additional $100 million Reopener, if warranted, for
95
environmental damages.
Notably, the civil and criminal components were closely
linked. Nine days after Judge Holland rejected the initial criminal
settlement, Exxon and Alaska withdrew from civil settlement nego96
tiations. The Alaska House of Representatives supported Judge
Holland’s decision, voting 27-13 to reject the settlement and to seek
$1.2 billion: $700 million for civil claims and $500 million in crimi97
nal fines. While it is difficult to identify motives, some people
were concerned about the impact of the settlement on the claims of
98
non-participating parties, Alaska Natives in particular. From a
legal strategy perspective, it made sense for Exxon to settle the
criminal and civil claims simultaneously, with exchanges and tradeoffs crossing civil-criminal boundaries. This conclusion is evidenced by the settlements being referred to as a single “$1.125 bil99
lion deal.”

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Parrish, supra note 76, at A1.
Parrish, supra note 77, at A1.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (“GAO”), REP. NO. B-254199, USE OF EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILL SETTLEMENT FUNDS 4 (1993).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Parrish, supra note 77, at A1.
96. Lee, supra note 83, at A1.
97. Id.; see Alaska House Rejects Exxon Deal, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1991, at 3.
98. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 183–84.
99. Parrish, supra note 76, at A1.
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As for Exxon Valdez Captain Hazelwood’s fate, he was acquitted on charges of driving a watercraft while intoxicated, reckless
endangerment, and criminal mischief, but was convicted of negligent discharge of oil. Ultimately, he was sentenced to a $1,000 fine,
$50,000 in reparations, and ninety days in jail. The sentence was
suspended in lieu of completing 1,000 hours of community ser100
vice.
2. The 1991 “Baseline” Document: Settling the Unknown.
Anyone intent on activating the Reopener must look closely at the
description of known effects at the time of the 1991 settlement.
The provision in the October 1991 Consent Decree is denominated
“Reopener for Unknown Injury” and applies only to damages that
are now recoverable but could not have been reasonably known or
101
Thus any inquiry turns to what was
anticipated in 1990-1991.
known and what could have been anticipated.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(“NOAA”) compiled a summary of studies into a preliminary estimate (“Summary of Injuries”) caused by the Exxon Valdez oil
102
This document served as a foundation for the settlement
spill.
negotiations, but it does not clearly state what was known or anticipated in 1990-1991.
Because of the biodiversity of Prince William Sound, this
document was difficult to create—most of the studies were inconclusive as to the numbers of animals killed and even what species
were affected. It is not surprising that the spill’s potential longterm effects were not fully articulated. In many respects, investigation had barely begun when the report was published, two years
after the spill. NOAA labeled the document “preliminary,” imply-

100. William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages and Tort Reform, 38
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1071, 1085 (2003). Originally, Superior Court Judge
Karl Johnstone wanted Hazelwood to spend his community service hours handscrubbing rocks in the affected areas. See CBS News, Exxon Valdez Restitution
Paid, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/16/national/main509364.shtml (May
16, 2002). By 1999, when the eight-year appeals process ended and Hazelwood’s
sentence was approved, the clean-up effort had been abandoned. Id. Instead,
Hazelwood fulfilled his community service by clearing litter and working in a soup
kitchen. Exxon Valdez Captain Is Serving His Sentence in a Soup Kitchen, DODGE
CITY DAILY GLOBE, June 23, 1999, available at http://www.dodgeglobe.com/stories/062399/new_exxon.shtml.
101. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 17.
102. Summary of Injuries to Natural Resources as a Result of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,687 (Apr. 11, 1991).
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ing a lack of reliable information for the purposes of litigation or
settlement.
The lack of a complete, accurate damages valuation suggests
the political nature of the settlement. At the same time, it reinforces the logic behind and need for the Reopener clause: governments were meant to revisit the claim later, after a full study of the
damages. Exxon, through payments to the Trustee Council, would
fund the studies later to be used as evidence of further injury.
Again, the Summary of Injuries was very preliminary; it openly
stated that more time was needed to evaluate the oil spill dam103
ages. The document discussed thirty-two species, in addition to
the intertidal and subtidal ecosystems and archaeological resource
damage. Of the thirty-two species, twenty-five needed further assessment to determine the extent of harm. The Summary of Injuries explained the difficulty of knowing how many animals died
from the spill, especially during the initial impact. Its predictions
were estimates.
Moreover, there was (and is) no indication in the Summary of
Injury that any long-term effects were anticipated, though they
were regarded as a possibility. With the benefit of hindsight, a National Research Council study determined in 2003:
One of the more profound outcomes of the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill was the recognition of our limited ability to realistically
predict the effects of an oil spill on marine resources. The ongoing debate over long-term damages further highlights just how
inadequate previous knowledge was in attempting to discern
cause and effect in natural environments. This lack of knowledge was, on one level, an incomplete understanding of what resources were present. But even more fundamental was a lack of
understanding of the structure and functioning of complex eco104
systems.

The 1991 settlement was thus approved despite a measure of
ignorance. The unexpected soon would be revealed and reflect
dire circumstances. The Reopener, a clause the governments did
105
not expect to invoke, now offers an opportunity to hold Exxon
accountable for the extent of the damage it caused.
C. A Reconstituted and Better-Directed Council
It is trivial, perhaps, to suggest that a different Trustee Council
might have gone in another direction. But it might be useful to ex-

103. Id. at 14,694.
104. COMM. TO REVIEW THE OIL SPILL RECOVERY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 51 (2003).
105. See 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 28.
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plore what potentially is a highly creative force for restoration of
long-term environmental damage. Can natural resource trustees
fulfill the potential for which they are acclaimed?
1. Theoretical and Practical Problems with Any Council:
Who, What, and How? As representatives of myriad competing
interests, it is not surprising that NRD trustees have been accused
of inefficiency, ineptitude, and self-dealing. Allegations against the
EVOS Trustee Council include: inefficient use of recovered funds,
abuse of settlement authority for the benefit of Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRPs”), preclusion of private claims, open conflicts
where trustees are PRPs, and problems inherent in concurrent trus106
tee jurisdiction.
First, NRD trustees may be taken to task for spending too
much money on administrative costs and not enough on restoration, rehabilitation, and acquisition of the equivalent of damaged
107
resources. The EVOS Trustee Council has gone astray in a similar manner, diverting $4.5 million in settlement funds to “restore
108
and protect waterways across the U.S.” These funds were used to
plant forest buffers along waterways in Chesapeake Bay—an admirable endeavor, to be sure, but completely unrelated to the restoration of Prince William Sound. The Trustee Council also acquired
land in and around Prince William Sound at a cost one-and-one109
half times the appraised value.

106. See, e.g., Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees:
Whose Side Are They Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407 (1999); Laura Rowley, NRD
Trustees: To What Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
459 (2001); Rhoda L. White, Comment, Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the
Trustees, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 407 (1990).
107. For example, in 1995 the Cantara Trustee Council, formed to oversee
funds recovered from a train derailment that spilled 19,000 gallons of herbicide
into the Sacramento River, announced it would spend the $14 million in recovery
damages on a variety of projects not affecting the river. See GAO, REP. NO. B270985, SUPERFUND: OUTLOOK FOR AND EXPERIENCE WITH NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE SETTLEMENTS 24 (1996).
108. Press Release, EPA, Browner Announces Availability of Exxon Valdez
Funds for Chesapeake Bay Watershed Protection Projects (Mar. 19, 1997),
http://www..epa.gov/newsroom/newsreleases.htm.
109. Through 1997, the trustees acquired nine parcels at a cost of $234 million,
with an appraised value of only $150 million. GAO, REP. NO. B-280449, STATUS
OF PAYMENTS AND USE OF EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL SETTLEMENT FUNDS 14
(1998). Three of the parcels were subject to ANCSA, offering a degree of protection from development and some restrictions on the land’s use. Department of the
Interior officials believed those protections and restrictions were difficult to act
upon. Id. at 18. The solution was to re-purchase the land.
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A second criticism of the NRD trustee system is that trustees,
as government actors, face a conflict of interest when seeking a settlement with a PRP that makes significant contributions to a state’s
economy. There can be little doubt that the federal and state governments took into account Exxon’s importance to the American
and Alaskan economies in reaching a settlement. Every tremulous
step of the process shows a disposition to avoid offense to oil. Silence on the Reopener thus seems predictable.
Third, government trustees may try to protect their exclusive
110
The Exxon Valdez litigation
authority to assert NRD claims.
confirms the federal and state governments’ monopoly in this re111
gard.
Fourth, in some instances the federal or state government will
be simultaneously a PRP and a trustee, such as where the federal
government is responsible under CERCLA for cleaning up military
facilities. The Exxon Valdez spill produced a similar conflict for
the State of Alaska, which faced potential liability from thousands
112
of fishermen, property owners, and Alaska Natives.
Finally, the statutory scheme establishing multiple NRD trus113
The
tees has built-in coordination and cooperation difficulties.
EVOS Trustee Council, comprised of three state and three federal
nominees, labors under a unanimity requirement for all Trustee
114
Council actions.
The Council also faces a practical problem related to the definition of natural resources, which “includes the ‘services’ provided
by the natural resources on which the villages and local . . .
115
econom[ies] depend.” In 1989, the National Wildlife Federation
(“NWF”) conducted a series of public hearings with Alaska resi-

110. Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000) (authority to
recover damages held by a trustee selected by the government) with Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (2000) (damages recoverable by any claimant injured by the loss of natural resources).
111. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1994)
(res judicata prevents private parties from recovering where a public trustee has
already recovered for the same injury).
112. See, e.g., Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon, 25 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. See Trustees for Natural Resources, 40 C.F.R. § 300.615(a) (2004) (anticipating need for cooperation among multiple trustees).
114. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, General Operating Procedures pt.
II-1 (July 9, 2002), http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/admin/progeneralop.pdf.
115. SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 74
(2001).
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dents.116 The compilers noted many aspects of Alaskan life that
could not be simply measured or restored by the trustees, despite
their best efforts to repair the ecosystem and replenish natural resources. The hearings testimony disclosed increased drug and alcohol abuse, a rise in child neglect and abuse, overloaded mental
117
health facilities, and increased suicide rates. Communities were
divided between long-term residents and those who came to Alaska
in search of high-paying clean-up jobs. Businesses lost employees
who abandoned their longtime positions to profit from the clean-up
effort. With the increase in people came an increase in crime,
118
waste, and traffic. In short, any attempt the EVOS trustees made
to restore natural resources could not alleviate the economic, environmental—even psychological—suffering of local communities
119
directly related to the spill.
2. Performance of the EVOS Trustee Council.
a. The Slow Start: “They Paid Themselves.” Between
1989 and 1991, the Trustee Council published three versions of its
assessment plan to identify the damages caused by the Exxon Val120
dez spill. The plans were prepared pursuant to CERCLA regulations acknowledging the government’s standing to sue for NRD
recovery. CERCLA also requires the Department of the Interior
121
Consequently, the
to develop procedures for assessing NRD.
Department published regulations for simple “Type A” assess122
ments and more complex “Type B” assessments. In providing for
two procedures, Congress “envisioned generally that Type A rules
would cover most minor releases and Type B rules would cover
123
large or unusually damaging releases.” Based on the magnitude
116. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens
Commission Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1990) (sponsored and published by the NWF in cooperation with Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”), the Wildlife Federation of Alaska, and the Windstar Foundation).
117. Id. at 37.
118. Id.
119. The Native populations, dependent on ecosystems damaged by the Exxon
Valdez spill, suffered psychological and cultural harm to their subsistence way of
life. For Natives, simple clean-up efforts could not compensate for the intangible
losses suffered “the day the water died.” Id. at 44–45.
120. See Christine Cartwright, Comment, Natural Damage Assessment: The
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Its Implications, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
451, 461–62 (1991).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (2000).
122. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 466.
123. Colorado v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Trustee Council was clearly correct in adopting a Type B assessment methodology.124
The first assessment plan, published in 1989, proposed nine
125
studies to quantify the economic value of the damaged resources.
Only one study examined the market value of lost services to hu126
mans. Around this time, the D.C. Circuit Court in Ohio v. De127
partment of the Interior reviewed Type B regulations, holding that
“market prices are not acceptable as primary measures of the use
128
The next plan, proposed in 1990,
values of natural resources.”
reflected Ohio’s influence: the Council sought to evaluate the in129
trinsic value of natural resources impacted by the Exxon spill. In
revising the studies, the Council included measures to assess the
cost of restoring, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the dam130
aged resources. The 1991 plan reiterated the methods of the 1990
studies and looked at increases in the market price of petroleum on
consumers. Building on Ohio, this plan better approximated the
131
The 1991 plan estimated
total NRD value caused by the spill.
damages in excess of $3 billion, a shocking figure that likely facili132
tated settlement—for one-third of that amount.
Through 1992, Exxon paid two annual installments (for a total
of $240 million) of the $900 million owed under the civil settle133
Of this, $107 million was returned to federal and state
ment.
agencies as reimbursement for pre-settlement clean-up and damage
134
An additional $40 million was offset against
assessment costs.

124. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 469–70.
125. The proposed studies included: (1) effects on commercial fishery prices;
(2) changes in fishing industry costs; (3) use value of commercial fisheries; (4) effect on value of public land; (5) economic injuries to recreational users of natural
resources; (6) value of impact to resources relied on by subsistence users; (7) loss
of intrinsic value of resources; (8) economic damage to research programs; and (9)
economic damage to archaeological sites. Id. at 479–81.
126. Deborah S. Bardwick, The American Tort System’s Response to Environmental Disaster, 19 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 259, 270 (2000).
127. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 463.
129. Bardwick, supra note 126, at 271 (specifically, the plan included contingent
valuation of recreational activities and intrinsic values of lost subsistence uses and
uses of archaeological sites).
130. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 483.
131. Id. at 488.
132. See John Lancaster, Value of Intangible Losses from Exxon Valdez Spill
Put at $3 Billion, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at A4.
133. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 5.
134. Id.
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Exxon’s payments for clean-up costs incurred in 1991.135 Sadly, this
136
reimbursement paid for a poorly managed effort: workers looted
137
archaeological sites, beaches were gravely damaged by hot water
138
139
scouring, and dispersants further contaminated the beaches.
Even the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) saw room for improvement, recommending that federal and state trustees work
proactively and cooperatively to spend the billion dollars more ef140
fectively.
Use of the civil settlement funds, less the reimbursements, has
been charted by Patty Brown-Schwalenberg, executive director of
the Chugach Regional Resources Commission as follows:

135. Id. at 3.
136. See SHARON E. MCCLINTOCK, OILED COMMUNITIES RESPONSE
INVESTIGATION REPORT, in 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 36 (“The effort to clean the oil was viewed as ridiculous. Every time workers would attempt
to [clean] the beaches, for example, groups, regulatory agencies or someone in a
monkey suit would arrive and say, ‘You’re killing seaweed.’ or ‘Stop, there might
be salmon in the stream.’” . . . “Exxon hired the crews for one day to pretend to
clean the beaches at Gore Point, but as soon as CBS News left, the crews were
demobilized. . . . Gore Point remained mired in oil.”)
137. IMPACT ASSESSMENT, INC., EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, CLEANUP, AND
LITIGATION: A COLLECTION OF SOCIAL-IMPACTS INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS 73–
74 (2001), available at http://www.mms.gov/alaska/reports/2003andOlderRpts/
EVOS/volume5.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 6–7 (recommending “[a]mong
other things, [that] attention should be given to (1) completing restoration and
land acquisition plans, (2) requiring more timely and better quality project reports,
(3) providing for more open competition for restoration projects, and (4) improving internal controls.”).
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Figure 3. Total EVOS ExpensesWithoutReimbursements. Courtesy of
141
Patty Brown-Schwalenberg.

b. Mid-Course Correction: The Tanker Blockade. It is
tempting to conclude the EVOS Trustee Council’s “eureka moment” occurred when Alaska’s salmon fishing fleet blockaded
142
tanker access to Valdez in the fall of 1993. An August 1993 GAO
143
report had criticized the Council’s procedures and outlays. This

141. Patty Brown-Schwalenberg, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Impacts and Response from a Tribal Perspective 14 (Chugach Regional Resources Comm’n, Jan.
2004) (draft paper for presentation, on file with author).
142. JOHN KEEBLE, OUT OF THE CHANNEL: THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND 323–25 (1999).
143. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 3. Of the $240 million paid by
Exxon through 1992, by February 1993 only $19 million had been spent on damage
assessment, restoration, and administrative costs. Of this, only $5.7 million went
towards restoration—this was approximately 2.4% of the amount paid by Exxon
to that point. Of the remaining $240 million, $107 million reimbursed federal and
state agencies and $40 million reimbursed Exxon for response costs, and $74 million remained in trust for future work. Id.
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was not news to local fishers, who were painfully aware of the lack
of progress on restoration and quite familiar with the shell-game
144
features of Council expenditures. Knowing that Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt was in Alaska, and that Exxon’s ship Sea
River Baton Rouge was due to enter the port of Valdez on August
19, a fishing fleet set up a blockade across the inlet, intending to
145
escort the ship to the terminal. The fishers hoped to raise awareness of their condition, but with advance knowledge of the block146
ade, Exxon delayed the ship’s approach. Other tankers also de147
layed entry, not wanting to take the heat intended for Exxon. For
possibly the first time since the opening of the Trans-Alaska pipe148
line, there were no tankers within Prince William Sound. Sympathy was definitely in the fishers’ favor—Governor Walter Hickel
149
declared, “[i]f I were a fisherman, I’d probably be out there too.”
Three days after the blockade began, Secretary Babbitt flew to
Valdez to meet with the fishers. He convinced them to end the
blockade in exchange for a promise to investigate their complaints
150
The Council was responsive and began to
against the Council.
finalize agreements for purchase of land and conservation ease151
ments on important forest habitat.
The Council also commenced a monitoring and research pro152
Council
gram that has grown in scope and intensity over time.
reports claim to have invested approximately $170 million on
“hundreds of research, monitoring, and general restoration pro153
jects,” to investigate the spill’s impact on a wide variety of spe154
cies, recreation, archaeological resources, and subsistence uses.
The EVOS Council also has encouraged large-scale ecosystem
studies, funding three long-term projects to assess ecosystem
health. The Sound Ecosystem Assessment (“SEA”) project is the
most ambitious, focusing on the spill’s impact on herring and pink
salmon fisheries, and funded at $22.4 million over a seven-year pe-

144. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 323–24.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 324–25.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. EVOS Trustee Council, Restoration Project Highlights, http://www.evostc.
state.ak.us/restoration/ highlights.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
154. For a list of project final reports, see http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/ restoration/projects.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
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riod.155 The Council also funded the Alaska Predator Ecosystem
Experiment (“APEX”), a five-year, $10.8 million project begun in
156
APEX investigated the general hypothesis that low food
1996.
abundance contributed to the decline of seabird and marine mam157
mal populations in Prince William Sound.
Finally, in order to study the continuing impact of oil on
mammal and bird species, in March 1995 the trustees approved a
$6.5 million Nearshore Vertebrate Program (“NVP”) to be con158
ducted over a period of five years. The NVP project focused on
four species, two that feed on fish (river otters and pigeon guillemots) and two that feed on shellfish (sea otters and harlequin
159
ducks). Despite its efforts, the Council could only study a fraction of the 128 species killed in the Exxon Valdez spill; there was
160
no follow-up research on marine invertebrates.
Additionally, the Council’s most conspicuous “restoration”
was the acquisition of a number of Native corporation properties
161
that were slated for clear-cutting. Although the impetus for this
action mostly came from environmentalists, the Native entities
162
benefited from less-than-fee transfers. However, strong and cogent objection was raised as to whether a twentieth-century environmental catastrophe should serve to divest Natives of their properties as efficiently as the much-maligned nineteenth-century In163
dian General Allotment Act.
155. EVOS Trustee Council, Ecosystem Based Research, http://www.evostc.
state.ak.us/restoration/ecosystem.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
156. OTT, supra note 3, at 319.
157. See Alaska Predator Ecosystem Experiment, http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/oil/
apex.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
158. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, MECHANISMS OF IMPACT AND POTENTIAL
RECOVERY OF NEARSHORE VERTEBRATE PREDATORS FOLLOWING THE 1989
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, FINAL REPORT 1 (2002), available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/final_reports/025chapters01.pdf.
159. Id. at 1.6–1.8.
160. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 140–41.
161. See Lankard, supra note 61, at 375–76 (discussing the forced transfer of
Native land rights to the government in exchange for an environmental restoration
program funded by Exxon damages).
162. An especially effective voice has been Mr. Rick Steiner, Director of the
Coastal Coalition, who has inundated authorities with a well-reasoned stream of
correspondence. Steiner suggests that $30 million of the Reopener could be used
to buy back and shut down the commercial herring fishery, causing a rebound in
herring stocks that would benefit the entire ecosystem. See Joel Gay, Herring
Buyback Urged, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2002, at B1.
163. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, Pub. L. 108-498, 24 Stat. 388, 388–91 (1887)
(providing for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reserva-
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c. Natives Left Out Again. The EVOS Trustee Council,
made up exclusively of state and federal employees, was less than
extravagant in the allotment of funds towards the restoration of
Native resources, even though Native villages were in the middle of
164
the spill area and the disaster interfered dramatically with subsis165
Alaska Natives seemed an afterthought to the
tence harvests.
Council—five years passed before Council personnel became in166
volved with Native communities in the spill area.
In 1994, the Council made its initial foray into the realm of
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (“TEK”) when the Council developed a handbook illustrating how its biologists could integrate
167
They also interviewed community
TEK into data collection.
members to document historical distribution patterns of various
168
species. Between 1995 and 2001, the Council engaged facilitators
(typically tribal government employees) from ten affected communities to increase communication between the Council and com169
munity members. Just over $6 million from the settlement with
Exxon was appropriated to the Alaska Department of Community
and Economic Development (“DCED”) in order to implement a
grant program, “with the purpose of restoring, replacing, or enhancing subsistence resources or other services damaged or lost as
170
The grants went to the
a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.”
nine non-incorporated communities of Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Port
tions and extending the protection of U.S. law over the Indians). For this piece of
regrettable history, see D.W.C. Duncan, How Allotment Impoverishes the Indians:
Testimony Before a Senate Comm. Investigating Conditions in the Indian Territory
(1906), reprinted in GREAT DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 286 (W.
Moquin & C. Van Doren eds., 1995).
164. Varanasi, supra note 40.
165. See 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 73 (graphic on “Annual
Round of Subsistence Resource Utilization in Port Graham and English Bay,
1981–1982”). The villages at Chignik Lake, Karluk, Nanwalek, Ouzinkie and Tatitlek are among the eight highest consumers of salmon in Alaska. See also Robert
Duff, Director, Wash. Office of Envt’l Health Assessments, Persistent Problem:
Widespread Chemical Contamination of Fish, Presentation at the Univ. of Or.
Envt’l Law Conference (Mar. 2005); cf. Robert J. Wolfer, Local Traditions and
Subsistence: A Synopsis from Twenty-Five Years of Research by the State of
Alaska, Dep’t of Fish & Game, TECH. PAPER NO. 284 (2004).
166. See EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EVOS TRIBAL AND COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT 2 (2002), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/
comminvrpt.pdf.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 1–2.
170. Id. at 4.
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Graham, Nanwalek, Karluk, Chignik Lake, Chignik Lagoon, Perryville, and Ivanof Bay.171 The three Alaska state representatives
on the Trustee Council are responsible for determining whether
172
As of 2002, twenty-four projects had been
grants are awarded.
173
funded with these grants.
The crucial subsistence issue of oiled food was addressed directly not by the EVOS Trustee Council but by the Society of En174
vironmental Toxicology and Chemistry (“SETAC”). Exxon also
played a role: in July 1989, Exxon and NOAA entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding related to the “Sampling and
175
Analysis of Subsistence Food Resources.” This crucial information on food warnings for subsistence users fell victim to the general embargo on litigation-sensitive studies and was not released,
176
Public review was
even in preliminary form, until March 1991.
177
pushed back to 1993.
Exxon Command decided to form its own team, including a
medical doctor and an industrial hygienist, to hold a series of
meetings in all the spill-area villages and with Native organizations about subsistence food impacts, toxicity of oil to residents,
and health threats to clean-up workers. These meetings were
two months before the [Oil Spill Health Task Force] sponsored
community meetings would begin. Exxon proceeded to arrange
with . . . [Native organizations] to hold a series of village meetings. Exxon also wanted to present the early risk-assessment results from the [Food and Drug Administration] and the sensory
test results from the [Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation] laboratory in Palmer. However, the downside of
this initiative by Exxon was that these Exxon-sponsored meetings
undermined the OSHTF’s attempts to serve as a unified communication team while fueling the villagers’ suspicions that they were
178
being manipulated by competing parties.

The independent experts evaluating the impact of the spill on
subsistence food resources reported on the “Crisis, Confusion, and
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

generally SOC’Y OF ENVT’L TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY,
EVALUATING AND COMMUNICATING SUBSISTENCE SEAFOOD SAFETY IN A CROSSCULTURAL CONTEXT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
(1999).
175. Id. at 317; see also id. at 243 (“Exxon made subsistence food safety a priority and designed a sampling program to be conducted in all spill areas (except the
Alaska peninsula) over a period of weeks.”).
176. Id. at 246.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 243–44 (emphasis added).
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Uncertainty Among Alaska Native Communities in the Oil Spill
Area.”179 They found a lack of leadership due to the fact that there
was no agency or organization with a “clear mandate” to address
180
subsistence food safety concerns. They also highlighted the reactions of Natives to this “void of responsibility” that initially resulted in the perception by many in the Native community that no
181
Natives were convinced that
one took their concerns seriously.
politics stood behind the infamous “double standard,” a zerotolerance policy for commercial fisheries if oil was present in quantities sufficient to foul gear, but any food for subsistence fisheries
was “likely safe to eat” if it had no smell, taste, or appearance of
182
oil.
d. The Current Course: Reopener or Not? Over time,
the EVOS Trustee Council achieved a modicum of independence
from its political sponsors. It developed a classification scheme for
183
expressing progress towards the goal of complete restoration. It
tracked thirty species and resources, characterizing them as “Not
Recovering,” “Recovering,” “Recovered,” or “Recovery Un184
known.” There has been no extended discussion of whether unmonitored conditions and species are “fully recovered,” as no information is available.
The Council’s most recent evaluation of the “Status of Injured
Resources” is as follows:

179. Id. at 237.
180. Id. at 239.
181. Id. at 239–42.
182. Id. at 247.
183. EVOS Trustee Council, Status of Injured Resources, http://www.evostc.
state.ak.us/facts/status.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). Apparently, the Status of
Injured Resources has not been updated since 2002—the same data is used in the
most recent EVOS Status Report. See EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, UPDATE ON
INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES (2002), available at http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/pdf/restoration/injupdate02.pdf.
184. Id.
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Recovered

Recovering

Not
Recovered

Recovery
Unknown

Archaeological
resources

Clams

Common loon

Cutthroat
trout

Pink salmon

Marbled
murrelet

Harlequin
duck

Dolly varden

River otter

Mussels

Cormorants
(3 species)

Kittlitz’s
murrelet

Sockeye
salmon

Wilderness
areas

Pacific herring

Rockfish

Bald eagle

Sea otter

Harbor seal

Subtidal
communities

Black
oystercatcher

Fish-eating
killer whale
pod AB

Pigeon
Guillemot

Common mure

Sediments

Table 1: Status of Injured Resources.

185

A “recovered” species is one that has returned to pre-spill
186
187
conditions or meets recovery objectives. “Recovering” means
188
“substantive progress is being made toward recovery objectives,”
189
Resources that are “not
with the timeline varying by resource.
recovered” are those demonstrating “little or no clear improve190
If labeled “recovery unment since spill injuries occurred.”
191
known,” limited data is available for that resource.

185. Id.
186. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35–37. Defining the “baseline” for
restoration is the single most important issue in valuing NRD.
187. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 2–3.
188. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35–37.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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In addition to the tracked resources, the EVOS Trustee Council recognizes that certain human services were impaired by the
spill, such as recreation and tourism, commercial fishing, subsis192
tence, and passive use. The Council considers these services “recovering until the resources on which they depend are fully recov193
ered.”
Certain Council staffers have written on the status of recovery
and the pursuit of the Reopener. For example, in 2003, Chief Scientist Phil Mundy advised the Council that Prince William Sound
was an “impaired water body” under EPA criteria and suggested
194
that conditions for triggering the Reopener were clearly met.
The Clean Water Act requires states to compile lists of impaired water bodies and then develop and implement total maxi195
TMDLs specify
mum daily loads (“TMDLs”) for these waters.
the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can sustain
196
and still meet water quality standards. In Alaska’s 2002-2003 Integrated Water Quality Monitoring and Assessment Report (required by the Clean Water Act), Prince William Sound is listed as
197
“impaired but not needing a TMDL.” The offered justification is
that a TMDL process would duplicate efforts of the EVOS Trustee
Council and restoration projects specified in the Exxon Valdez
198
Restoration Plan.
Water quality standards are developed based on the uses for
which a water body is allocated. In Alaska, marine water uses include aquaculture, seafood processing, recreation, growth and
propagation of fish and other wildlife, and harvesting of raw

192. Id. at 31–32; see also UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 23–28.
193. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 31–32.
194. E-mail from Phil Mundy, Chief Scientist, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee
Council, to Jeep Rice & Molly McCammon (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Mundy
Email] (on file with author). An “impaired water body” is one that has not attained and maintained water quality standards even after point sources of pollution have installed the required levels of pollution control technologies. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 130.2(j), 131.3(h) (2004).
195. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (2004).
196. Id. § 132.2. For an introduction to TMDL regulations, see Oliver A.
Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation
Under the Clean Water Act, 27 E.L.R. 10329 (1997).
197. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVT’L CONSERVATION, FINAL INTEGRATED WATER
QUALITY MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT REPORT 49 (2003), available at
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/water/wqsar/pdfs/finali%20integrated%202002-2003
%20report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY REPORT].
198. Id.
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aquatic life.199 In order to meet water quality standards, Prince William Sound would have to be free of concentrations of petroleum
hydrocarbons in shoreline or bottom sediments that cause deleterious effects to aquatic life; surface waters and adjoining shore-lines
would have to be virtually free from floating oil, film, sheen, or discoloration; surface water could not exceed concentrations that individually or in combination impart odor or taste as determined by
organoleptic tests; and raw aquatic life organisms could not exceed
concentrations that impart undesirable odor or taste as determined
200
by bioassay or organoleptic tests. Prince William Sound can be
considered impaired because the presence of petroleum hydrocarbons, oil, and grease is not low enough to satisfy the standards
201
linked to those uses.
Sixteen years after the spill, Prince William Sound may still be
considered impaired because of the presence of Exxon’s petroleum
hydrocarbons, oil, and grease. The State of Alaska justifies avoidance of expensive TMDL analysis and implementation by referring
202
But
to the Trustee Council’s “pollution control requirements.”
habitat monitoring and assessment—what the EVOS Trustee
Council does—are not “pollution control requirements.” Rather,
203
Who will tell
the Council’s strategy relies on natural recovery.
the TMDL planners that the State is prepared to leave $100 million
on the table because it does not know what to do with it?
In 2003, the Trustee Council’s Executive Director, Molly
McCammon, hinted that there were sufficient grounds for invoking
the Reopener. In a memo to the Council, McCammon discussed
additional oil-spill-related injuries to natural resources that have
204
McCammon noted
been discovered since the 1991 settlement.
that for some species, “and for the ecosystem itself,” the Council
205
could not know if full recovery had occurred. Thus, the Council
implemented the Gulf Ecosystem Monitoring Program in 1999, as a

199. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 70.020 (2005).
200. Id.
201. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(j), 131.3(i) (2004); see also Mundy Email, supra note
194.
202. WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 196, at 5, 10, 20, 71.
203. EVOS Trustee Council, Restoration Project Highlights, supra note 153
(noting that “in most cases, if protected from harm, injured species will recover on
their own”).
204. Memorandum from Molly McCammon, Executive Director, EVOS Trustee Council, to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alaska Att’y Gen., and Trustee Council
Members 7–9 (June 12, 2003) (on file with author).
205. Id. at 5.
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“means of ensuring and enhancing restoration and recovery well
into the future.”206
From the beginning, the State of Alaska and the United States
207
did not support the idea of invoking the Reopener clause. Nonetheless, they seem to understand that a decision to forego the Re208
opener would attract intense public scrutiny. The EVOS Trustee
Council has hired a consultant to help with these matters, but this
has produced its own stumbles. Integral Consulting has been contracted to conduct “a series of evaluations using available scientific
data to provide an independent analysis of [the] recovery status of
209
The
key resources and to define any linkage to residual oil.”
work includes “a re-survey of sediment quality . . . to assess in situ
levels of toxicity in areas most likely to remain oil-impaired,” and a
“synthesis of scientific information relevant to injury from lingering
oil . . . [that] will provide information on the status of injured re210
sources and options for future restoration.”
According to Integral’s website, the firm has developed a
“conceptual exposure model” (“CEM”) to provide a “pictorial representation of the relationship between oil and injured resources,”
and a framework for assessing resources currently listed as Recov211
ering or Not Recovered.

206. Id. McCammon also noted, in the “best judgment of the scientists most
closely familiar with oil spill injury,” there were species and resources whose injuries were likely related to the oil spill but it was difficult to prove a cause-effect
linkage; there were also species whose injury was strongly linked to the spill. Id. at
7–9 (“Probable injury unknown at time of settlement, with stronger linkage to oil
spill [includes]: injury to subsistence uses . . . pink salmon had more damage than
expected . . . oil remaining in the environment in a toxic state for a longer period
of time than originally expected . . . mussel beds data in 1999 indicate that oil is
still being accumulated in mussels and several other invertebrate prey species. . . .”).
207. 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 28 (“[b]ased on the
results of the damage assessment, the Governments do not believe that they will
ever need to invoke [the Reopener] clause”).
208. Compare Craig R. O’Connor, Natural Res. Special Counsel, NOAA Office of Gen. Counsel, Interview with NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law
(Feb. 3, 2005) (on file with author); with Jim Carlton, Groups Seek to Add $100
Million to Bill for Exxon Oil Spill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at B4.
209. Integral Consulting: News, http://www.integral-corp.com/page.php?pname
=news/article&article_id=42 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
210. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, WORKPLAN FY 2004–FY 2006 26 (2004),
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/Work%20Plans/Final_2004_Workplan.pdf.
211. Integral Consulting: News, supra note 209.
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However, the contract with Integral has raised concerns about
conflicts of interests for the Council.212 Ernesta Ballard, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
213
until October 2004, initially recommended Integral. In February
2005 she admitted to having worked with Integral on a project for
214
Ketchikan Pulp Company before she joined state government.
The impartiality of Integral is also questionable when it comes to
developing projects financed by Reopener funds—Integral’s website notes that its scientists are trained technically and policy-wise
215
In other words, the
to assist PRPs in addressing NRD claims.
Trustee Council has hired a PRP consultant for its Reopener advice. We recommend, instead, that questions about ongoing restoration be referred to a committee of the National Research Council. We are confident that this is the best way to get unbiased advice at a reasonable cost.
Apparently, the Council itself is unsure if Integral’s work will
216
completely answer all questions. The Council issued a Request
for Proposals (“RFP”) on February 15, 2005, to study possible
remediation projects to address the problem of lingering oil in
217
sediments. The Council’s language is instructive:

212. GAO, REP. NO. B-280449, supra note 109, at 5–6 (“The same agencies—
and sometimes the same individuals—that recommend a project for funding also
approve and carry out the project.”).
213. Tom Kizzia, 16 Years Later, Pressure Mounts To Settle Spill Suit–Exxon
Valdez: State, Federal Lawyers Must Decide By Next Summer Whether to Seek
Additional Damages, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2005, at A1.
214. Id.
215. Integral Consulting: NRD Assessment, http://www.integral-corp.com/page.
php?pname=projects/damage (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
216. Three major initial findings resulted from Integral’s review and synthesis:
(1) lingering oil most significant in intertidal areas; (2) surface Exxon Valdez oil
(the focus of evaluation efforts following the oil spill) has a patchy distribution
pattern and persists predominantly in a weathered form that is not bio-available;
and (3) subsurface Exxon Valdez oil has experienced more limited weathering and
degradation, is sequestered in armored beaches and sheltered shorelines, and has
greater bioavailability. Most resources currently classified as injured have limited
or no exposure to lingering oil. Integral Consulting: News, supra note 209.
217. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RFP: IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE OIL
REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO LINGERING OIL IN PRINCE
WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA 4 (2005), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/
pdf/05LingeringOil_RFP.pdf. The Council noted, based on NOAA findings,
“approximately 28 acres (approximately 56 tons) of lingering oil is estimated to
persist in intertidal sediments of beaches in PWS. Although this is a small fraction
of the total area oiled in 1989, it nevertheless remains a potential concern for
ongoing exposure to resources that have not recovered from injury caused by the
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Given the recent findings on lingering oil, it is an appropriate
time to identify potential options for further clean up, evaluate
them for effectiveness, economic cost, environmental benefits
and environmental impacts. The fundamental question: Is there
is [sic] a clean up strategy that can feasibly be implemented for
the 28 acres of sub-surface oil in Prince William Sound that
218
would be better than natural recovery?

Proposals were due March 16, 2005, with a final report due in
219
With the problem defined as “28 acres of subJanuary 2006.
surface oil,” sweeping remedies are not likely to come about.
In February 2005, the EVOS Trustee Council also issued an
RFP for “the synthesis of information relevant to Pacific herring
220
and the determination of the status of this species.” The Council
is seeking to evaluate the recovery of Pacific herring by conducting
an independent evaluation of the eighteen previously conducted
monitoring and research projects of Pacific herring populations in
221
Proposals are also due March 16, 2005,
Prince William Sound.
222
with a final report due in January 2006.
D. The Civil Suits: More “What Ifs”
In the immediate wake of the spill, the Exxon Corporation
faced enormous potential NRD liabilities. The common law was
anticipated to offer broad protections under the theories of public
223
trust, parens patriae, and public nuisance. Statutory definitions of
224
“natural resources” protected all affected resources. Contingency
valuation, to measure damages, gauged liabilities in the many bil-

initial spill. . . .” (citations omitted). The Council distinguished between ‘regular’
lingering oil and EVOS oil, which is “is less susceptible to weathering processes
and is generally more persistent.” Id.
218. Id. at 5.
219. Id. The due date is only four months prior to the deadline for invoking the
Reopener, as Exxon must receive ninety days notice of intent to invoke the Reopener.
220. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RFP: EXPERT REVIEW—PACIFIC HERRING
POPULATIONS IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA 4 (2005), available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/05Herring_RFP.pdf.
221. Id. at 5.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907) (noting
that a state is entitled to protect against the pollution of its natural resources via
legislation and involvement of the courts); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 458 (1892) (noting that laws “have sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within their limits against infringement, subjecting it only to such
regulation by the State, in the interest of the public”).
224. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000).
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lions of dollars.225 The grim economic reality of “restoring” the ecological treasures of Prince William Sound offered no solace—what
would it cost to “save” a sea otter or an eagle? The rehabilitation
226
rates were $90,000 and $42,000, respectively. At these rates, the
company was facing astronomical out-of-pocket costs.
The EVOS settlement was a win for Exxon because of the
company’s brilliantly conceived and effectively implemented defensive strategy. The strategy consisted of: (1) takeover and domination of the clean-up; (2) voluntary payments to most-injured parties; (3) quick settlement of initial NRD claims; and (4) aggressive
resistance of subsequent NRD claims.
1. Takeover and Domination of the Cleanup.

Figure 4. The Clean-up. Courtesy of Brad Marten, Esq.

The Prince William Sound clean-up was a disaster on the
ground, but a legal success for Exxon. Exxon, which presented itself as having done the best it could throughout the crisis, was able
to assume a “good citizen” mantle, which would prove enormously
227
beneficial over the long haul. As a good citizen, Exxon was reim225. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 74, at A1.
226. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 303. Total costs to Exxon of wildlife restoration and rehabilitation were $41 million, though this represents only the costs of
rehabilitating directly oiled animals. Id.
227. Parrish, supra note 77, at A1 (quoting U.S. District Judge H. Russel Holland).
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bursed for cash paid in the NRD settlement, was spared a $125 million fine in the criminal case, and won reduction of the punitive
damages award against it.
With the help of its lawyers, Exxon passed a substantial share
of spill-related costs onto its insurers. After six years of arbitration
and litigation, Exxon and a consortium of over 100 international
228
insurers settled a coverage dispute arising from the spill. The set229
Exxon claimed coverage under
tlement totaled $780 million.
various sections of its policies, including first-party property recovery for removal of debris, marine liability to repay cargo-owners’
230
losses, and general liability for pollution clean-up costs. The settlement provided relief for the expenses incurred in the clean-up—
231
Exxon claims these expenses exceeded $2.5 billion.
The outer limits of “good citizen” cost recovery were reached
only in the takings challenge Exxon brought against the act of Congress that banished the Exxon Valdez from the waters of Prince
William Sound. Congress declared in the 1990 OPA that any tank
vessel that spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the marine environment of Prince William Sound after March 22, 1989,
232
This provision effectively
was to be excluded from the Sound.
banned only the Exxon Valdez, as no other tank vessel had spilled
233
more than one million gallons of oil into the marine environment.
In ruling on Exxon’s takings claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was not impressed with Exxon’s argument that this was the
first bill of attainder ever directed at an inanimate object. The
court held the OPA provision was not an unconstitutional bill of
attainder because it did not punish Exxon, and that the provision
did not violate procedural due process because it furthered a ra234
tional legislative purpose. The court found it “rational for Congress to use this past disaster as a measure of future performance to
specifically bar the Exxon Valdez from transporting oil through
Prince William Sound, an area that Congress has accorded special
235
statutory protection.”

228. Mitchell F. Dolin, An Overview of the Exxon Valdez Insurance Coverage
Dispute, 5 INT’L INS. L.R. 313, 313–317 (1997).
229. Id. at 317.
230. See id. at 313.
231. Richard Pyle, Insurers Want Off Spill Hook: Companies Say Exxon’s
Cleanup a PR Ploy, Balk at Paying, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1993.
232. 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (2000).
233. See SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2002).
234. Id. at 680.
235. Id.
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2. Exxon Voluntary Payments. The strategy of making voluntary payments to most injured parties was well conceived and quite
successful. It soaked up the private claims and undercut the
236
Of course, it
broader litigation strategies of private claimants.
was not just strategy—Exxon greatly benefited from the federal
district court’s ruling that plaintiffs must exhaust the $100 million
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act Fund (“TAPF”) before
237
pursuing their claims. TAPF cushioned the initial blow for Exxon
across a broad spectrum of claimants because the fund did not pay
out on a first-come, first-served basis, but rather paid proportion238
Claimants therefore had to settle
ately on all accepted claims.
239
with or fight Exxon for the remaining balance.
In the first year of litigation, approximately 52,000 plaintiffs
240
filed more than 200 suits against Exxon in federal and state court.
While many claimants argued amongst themselves whether individual or class action suits were the best way to proceed, Exxon
241
settled with over 10,000 claimants for a total of $235 million.
Exxon encouraged settlement by making litigation as complicated
and intimidating as possible for potential plaintiffs, consistently
challenging who had standing to sue or be sued. In litigation, typical defenses Exxon employed included: (1) the “who me?” (arguing
that Bligh Reef was not well marked and/or government officials
were to blame for clean-up damages because Exxon was following
government orders); (2) the “why are you whining?”(arguing that
fishers’ and cannery workers’ lost wages could be offset by wages
earned for spill clean-up); (3) the “haven’t we suffered enough?”
(arguing that punitive damage awards in one case should bar punitive awards in another); and (4) the “stiff arm” of precedent set in

236. On the lawyers’ rush to Alaska following the spill, see DAVID LEBEDOFF,
CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME
(1997) (especially ch. 4).
237. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (2000) (discussing liability caps and the TransAlaska Pipeline Liability Fund); Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 19.
Compare generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 with D. Alan Rudlin, Packaging Toxic
Tort Cases for Trial: Use of Test Cases, Bifurcation and Class Actions, 406 PLI/LIT
185 (1991) and Keeva, supra note 2, at 67–68.
238. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 170 (“If the total claims allowed exceed $100 million, each person’s claims are reduced proportionately.”).
239. Darrin J. Quam, Right to Subsist: The Alaska Natives’ Campaign to Recover Damages Caused by the Exxon Valdez Spill, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
177, 185–86 (1992).
240. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 155.
241. Id. “By 1995, Exxon had paid more than $304 million in settlement of
private claims through the Claims Program.” Id. at 179.
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Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint242 (precluding recovery of
economic losses “absent physical damage to a proprietary inter243
est”).
Exxon established a program for fishers whose claims looked
like clear courtroom winners, paying the fishers’ net average in244
come for the preceding three seasons prior to the spill. In 1994,
Exxon settled with various municipalities and with a class of Alaska
245
Native subsistence users, at a cost just over $214 million.
Exxon strategically employed a divide-and-conquer strategy
for compensatory damages but pushed for and won a broad manda246
tory class certification on the award of punitive damages. Without the opt-out clause of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
247
certification, Exxon was able to consolidate all potential punitive
claims and delay payment of damages. To date, no plaintiff has
248
received any of the $5 billion award. Yet Exxon is alleged to earn
about 18% on its investments, while the unpaid punitive award ac249
crues interest at a mere 6%. At this rate, it appears the punitive
damage award (and the tax-deductible legal expenses for the endless stream of motions challenging it) could soon pay for itself.
Exxon’s voluntary payment strategy was successful on many
levels. For one, the claims program was an effective public relations tool, as Exxon publicized its payments to highly visible and
sympathetic candidates (i.e. fishers). Early settlement also saved
Exxon from the headache of further litigation, a strategy that paid
250
off well for the company (as discussed below). However, perhaps
the greatest benefit to Exxon was arranging and entrenching a
damages standard before the affected parties realized the potential
extent of the damages. Alaska Governor Tony Knowles wrote to

242. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
243. See Richard Mauer, Exxon Responds to 140 Lawsuits, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 16, 1989, at A1.
244. N. Robert Stoll, Litigating and Managing a Mass Disaster Case: An Oregon
Plaintiff Lawyer’s Experience in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, 56-OCT.
OR. ST. B. BULL. 14, 19 (1995).
245. Id.
246. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2 at 161.
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
248. This is because the case has bounced back-and-forth between the Ninth
Circuit and the District of Alaska. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d
1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (appeal pending).
249. 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later (CBS Television Broadcast Mar. 21, 1999)
(estimating 6.5 years for Exxon to generate investment accrual to pay the judgment).
250. See discussion infra pt. II(D)(6)(b).

110805 02_RODGERS.DOC

2005]

1/3/2006 4:49 PM

EXXON VALDEZ REOPENER

175

Exxon in December 2001, offering the resources of his office to facilitate resolution of outstanding claims by Alaskans in the wake of
251
Exxon rethe Ninth Circuit decision on punitive damages.
sponded a month later, pointing out that all actual damages were
already paid, and only unpaid punitive damages remained an issue.
Faced with only the punitive damages issue, Exxon was able to
wash its hands of actual damages left in Alaska.
Clearly, Exxon sought cost certainty. Recognizing the enormity of the disaster, Exxon was extremely proactive in setting the
price of its own liability. Exxon’s desire for certainty also explains
its fear of the Reopener, which represents open-ended liability for
future spills. Thus, the Reopener is a dangerous proposition from
Exxon’s point of view.
3. Quick Settlement of NRD Claims. The successful settlement of the NRD claims can only look better to Exxon with each
passing year. In March 1991, the United States and the State of
252
As menAlaska, acting as trustees for the public, sued Exxon.
tioned above, the three parties reached a civil and criminal settlement that was approved by the district court on October 8, 1991.
The resulting Consent Decree stated that the state and federal governments would recover compensatory and remedial relief in their
capacity “to act on behalf of the public as trustees of Natural Resources to recover damages for injury to Natural Resources arising
253
from the Oil Spill.” The inclusion of this clause in the Consent
Decree invoked the doctrine of res judicata and purports to bar
claims brought by other plaintiffs for damages to natural resources
254
caused by the oil spill. Thus, after the approval of the 1991 settlement agreement, the only actionable claims could be those of
trustees not represented or of parties suffering damages different
255
from those incurred by the general public.
From Exxon’s perspective, the quick settlement of the NRD
claims was a triumph. Though the settlement amount was at the
time unprecedented, it did not approach Exxon’s annual profits of

251. Letter from Alaska Gov. Tony Knowles to Exxon Corp. (Dec. 28, 2001)
(responding to decision in In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)) (on
file with author).
252. Alaska v. Exxon, No. A91-083 CV (D. Alaska Mar. 15, 1991); United
States v. Exxon, No. A91-082 CV (D. Alaska Mar. 13, 1991).
253. See Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 3.
254. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 185–86.
255. Id.
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$5 billion.256 More importantly, the civil settlement insulated Exxon
257
from NRD claims beyond $900 million.
The $100 million Reopener was a small, albeit unwelcome,
concession in Exxon’s broader strategy—for the governments, it
served as a sweetener that would facilitate approval of the settle258
ment. In 1991, the Exxon legal team believed that the contingencies anticipated by the Reopener were remote and unlikely; if for
some reason they came to pass, the company would likely be able
to block the issue at that time. Moreover, $100 million was not a
significant amount and chances for recovering it seemed slim.
4. Strategic Settlement of the Chenega Bay Case. The Native
tribes were parties to neither the lawsuits nor the settlement between Exxon and the federal and state governments. These tribes
represented a grave threat to the NRD settlement, but their ad259
vances were repelled in Chenega Bay.
In March 1991, after unsuccessful attempts to participate in
negotiations on the pending settlement between the Alaska and
260
federal governments and Exxon, the Native Village of Chenega
261
Bay and other Native villages and corporations sued in the Dis-

256. Id. at 188.
257. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 7.
258. See Keith Schneider, In Exxon Deal, Transportation Chief Wins Another
One for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at A18.
259. Native Vill. of Chenega Bay v. Lujan, Nos. 91-483, 91-484 CV, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2986 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1991) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
260. Quam, supra note 239, at 182.
261. The “Native Interests” included the following tribes, villages and corporations, grouped into two broad classes. First, the Alaska Native Class: all Alaska
Natives, all traditional Native organizations and other Native entities who have or
may have claims against the State of Alaska or the United States arising out of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, including all those who engage in, rely upon, promote, preserve, or provide services for, wholly or in part, a subsistence way of life in the
following areas: Native Village of Chenega Bay, Eyak Native Village, Port Graham Village, the Native Village of English Bay, the Native Village of Tatitlek, the
Native Village of Kodiak, the Native Village of Larsen Bay, the Native Village of
Karluk, the Native Village of Port Lions, the Native Village of Akhiok, the Native
Village of Ouzinke, Ivanoff Bay Village, the Native Village of Chignik Bay, Seward, Valdez, the Native Village of Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake Village and the
Native Village of Perryville, the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the Kodiak Island
Borough, the Lake and Peninsula Borough and the Aleutians East Borough. Second, the ANCSA Corporation Class: all Native Corporations, as that termed is
used within the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§
1601–05, who have or may have claims against the State of Alaska or the United
States arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, including all those who are legal or
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trict Court for the District of Columbia for an injunction preventing the settlement.262 In these consolidated cases, the Native interests argued that the proposed deal between the government entities
and Exxon would compromise individual plaintiffs’ rights to seek
263
relief against Exxon and Alyeska. The Native interests asserted a
right to act as trustees for NRD recovery because the Natives depended on the impacted resources to sustain subsistence cultures.
They also argued for government consultation with them, before
damage assessments or restoration activities could be performed on
264
In opposition, the governments countered that
Native lands.
“resolution of the [United States’ NRD claims] should not impair
265
Judge Stanley Sporkin interrights or claims of third parties.”
preted this claim to mean that “Exxon and Alyeska may be liable
to the plaintiffs for damages to natural resources and/or lands they
have an interest in, even if it is claimed the same natural resources
and/or lands are covered by the settlement agreement among [the
266
Thus, Judge Sporkin
governments] and Exxon and Alyeska.”
267
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but retained jurisdiction to “ensure that the defendants’ representations
268
are carried out so that plaintiffs’ rights are protected.” In April
1991, the court found that the proposed settlement between the
governments and Exxon might interfere with the natural resources
269
rights of Alaska Natives. Judge Sporkin ordered discovery to ascertain if Exxon intended to use the civil settlement against the Na270
In his deposition, the Chairman of Exxon retive interests.
sponded that the interests of Alaska Natives were not even consid271
ered in the proposed settlement.
After successfully delaying the government-Exxon settlement
for seven months, and possibly influencing a slightly higher crimi-

equitable owners of real property in the geographic area encompassed by the
Alaska Native Class. See Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 2.
262. Native Vill. of Chenega Bay, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2986.
263. Id. at *1.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *2.
267. Id. at *3.
268. Id.
269. Quam, supra note 239, at 184.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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nal penalty against Exxon,272 the Native interests consented to their
273
own settlement with the governments in September 1991.
In the agreement between the governments and the Natives,
the governments retained all rights to act as trustees for natural
resources, and excluded the Native interests from acting as co274
The Natives gave up any right to sue for, receive, or
trustees.
275
control the use of any NRD recoveries arising from the oil spill.
However, the governments recognized that the Native interests retained the rights to pursue claims for all private harms result276
ing from injuries caused by the oil spill. Though the governments
promised to “endeavor to restore the natural resources injured by
the oil spill, including those resources used for subsistence,” nothing in the Consent Decree required
either Government to take any action which, in its judgment, is
unnecessary or inappropriate in light of statutory and other legal
standards applicable to damage assessment or restoration process or to allocate, set aside, or expend any portion of any natural
resource damage recovery received by the Governments for the
specific
purpose of restoring natural resources used for subsis277
tence.

The governments also agreed to obtain consent from the appropriate Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) Cor278
poration Class prior to conducting damage assessments or resto279
ration activities on Corporation lands, and, as required by federal
and state law, to consider the views of the Corporation Class prior
to making decisions regarding such assessments and activities on
lands which the corporations had selected but were not yet con-

272. Id. at 178.
273. See generally Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45.
274. Id. at ¶ 5.
275. Id. at ¶ 6.
276. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. A primary goal of the Native Corporations was preservation
of their property interests in these lands in “interim jurisdiction.” The corporations successfully lobbied Congress to include a provision in the 1990 OPA to vest
the corporations with title, as of March 23, 1989 (the day before the spill), to lands
they had already selected. The Native villages’ interests were not the same as the
Native corporations; they instead wanted to preserve their right to sue Exxon for
economic, subsistence, and natural resource damages and to establish a fund that
would be administered by Alaska Natives to monitor the environment and ecology
of the area. See Quam, supra note 239, at 190.
277. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 9.
278. Id. at ¶ 9; see also id. at ¶ 2(b) (defining ANCSA as a settlement class).
279. Id. at ¶ 10.
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veyed to the corporation.280 The Corporation Class agreed to allow
281
the governments to access their lands for such activities.
The Native interests were granted representatives on any pub282
lic advisory groups that might be established in the future. Moreover, the United States and the Native interests agreed to commence a joint study on the impact of the oil spill on natural re283
sources used for subsistence. Though Alaska was not required to
participate in the study, it retained the right to gain access to study
284
results and monitor its progress. The governments agreed to pro285
vide scientific data for the study to the Native interests. The Native interests considered this provision a victory because the United
States government was previously unwilling to share the results of
286
studies it conducted in anticipation of litigation with Exxon. The
Native interests intended to use this information in their pending
287
civil suit against Exxon.
Finally, and probably most importantly with respect to the
Reopener, the settlement between the Native interests and the
governments resulted in dismissal of the complaints filed in the
288
Any Alaska Native interest intervening to
D.C. district court.
enforce the Reopener must overcome the preclusive effect of this
decree. One way to circumvent this effect is to note that the word
“tribes” did not appear in the definition of “Alaska Native
289
Class.” Moreover, Reopener claims did not exist at the time of
this Chenega Bay settlement; they did not exist until the principal
case was settled the following month.
If Native representatives in this case actually “settled” future
claims for unknown NRD, then questions arise over public trust or
federal Indian trust limitations on the authority of trustees to dispose of their patrimony in this manner.
5. Successful Defense of the Exclusivity of the NRD Settlement
Process. Perhaps Exxon’s greatest “success” during the litigation

280. Id. at ¶ 12.
281. Id. at ¶ 11.
282. Id. at ¶ 13.
283. Id. at ¶ 14.
284. Id.
285. Id. This study is discussed above, in pt. II(C)(2)(c).
286. See Ann D. Cummings, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Confidentiality
of Natural Resource Damage Assessment Date, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 364–65
(1992).
287. Id. at 366.
288. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 23.
289. Id. at ¶ 2.
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and settlement was the transformation of the NRD process from
one in which many parties could sue for money damages and broad
equitable remedies to one in which only the United States and the
State of Alaska could merely seek the narrowest of injunctions.
This process unfolded in two steps.
a. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon. In June 1989,
the Alaska Sport Fishing Association (“ASFA”) filed a class action
in Alaska Superior Court on behalf of an estimated 130,000 recreational sport fishers who used Prince William Sound and other areas
290
affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages “to provide for an environmental miti291
gation and monitoring fund.” In August 1989, the National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Wildlife
292
Federation of Alaska also sued, seeking to establish a conservation trust fund to restore the ecology of the oil spill area, to protect
the area from further environmental harm, to restore wildlife populations on land and in the sea, to fund scientific studies and monitoring, and to acquire resources equivalent to those lost in the
293
294
spill. These suits were later consolidated.
The October 1991 Consent Decree defined NRD to include
“remedial relief recoverable by the Governments in their capacity
as trustees of Natural Resources . . . under any federal or state stat295
ute or maritime or common law relating to the environment.”
Exxon moved for removal of the consolidated cases to federal
court and for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was in dero296
gation of the Consent Decree. The district court granted Exxon’s
motion, ruling that the plaintiffs were in privity with the governments in entering into the Consent Decree, and that res judicata
297
precluded further claims for public relief. In 1994, the Ninth Cir298
cuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Though the district court

290. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv., No. 3AN-89-5188 CV
(Alaska Super. Ct. 1989)).
291. Id.
292. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN-89-6957 CV (Alaska Super.
Ct. filed Aug. 17, 1989), cited in Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773,
775–76 (9th Cir. 1994).
293. See Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 776.
294. Id.
295. See Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
296. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 776.
297. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994).
298. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 781.
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allowed ASFA to amend its complaint to “better allege their
uniquely private claims,”299 the court ultimately was “convinced
that the sport fishermen were unable to allege private claims be300
cause these plaintiffs suffered no private injury.” The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court ruling, finding that the Consent Decree
was res judicata and covered all “lost use” damages and that the
plaintiffs, in privity with the governments under the parens patriae
doctrine, had been represented by the governments when the gov301
ernments entered into the Consent Decree.
The plight of the Alaska sport fishermen and the environmental groups exemplified how the courts took an anti-plaintiff
302
stance in private suits brought in response to the oil spill. Commentators have argued that there is a substantial difference be303
tween active and passive loss of use. Nevertheless, the holding in
this case confirms that whenever the government enters into a settlement decree, res judicata and parens patriae can be used to
quash all remaining NRD claims, even in the face of allegations
that the government did not act in the best interest of private par304
ties or the public resource.
b. In re Native Class. As described above, Alaska Natives brought a class action suit against Exxon, seeking damages for
305
the loss of their subsistence way of life. Originally, the class was
306
composed of all Alaska Natives and Native organizations. Subsequently, the class was limited to 3,455 individual Natives (thereby

299. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 771.
300. Id. at 772.
301. Id. at 771–73.
302. See Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corp. Highlights the Need to Take a Hard Look at the Doctrine of Parens Patriae When Applied in Natural Resource Damage Litigation, 25 ENVTL. L. 897, 908–09 (1995).
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. Christopher V. Panoff, In re The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class v.
Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living, and the Special Injury Rule,
28 ENVTL. L. 701, 703–04, n.14 (1998) (“In addition to claimed damage to a subsistence way of life, the complaint alleged injury to archaeological sites and artifacts,
natural resources and property upon which the plaintiffs depend as part of their
natural habitat and lives” and defining “subsistence way of life” as “dependent
upon the preservation of uncontaminated natural resources, marine life and wildlife, and reflects a personal, economic, psychological, social, cultural, communal
and religious form of daily living”).
306. Id. at 703 n.13.

110805 02_RODGERS.DOC

182

1/3/2006 4:49 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[22:2

excluding Native villages and government entities).307 The suit was
308
filed in state court but removed to federal court, where the claims
were split into: (1) economic damages due to loss of harvest, and
(2) non-economic damages due to injury to the subsistence cul309
ture. The Native class settled with Exxon for the economic dam310
ages. The court then granted Exxon’s motion for summary judg311
ment on all non-economic injuries.
In his decision dismissing the case, Judge Holland declared
that “[t]he law remains that a private litigant cannot recover damages for a public nuisance unless he or she can show a special injury
312
different in kind from that suffered by the general public.” The
class argued that the “unique nature of their subsistence lifestyle
313
[was] the keystone to their culture.” This “special injury” rule is
a relic that restricts private standing to correct public nuisances
“ostensibly . . . to protect defendants from a multiplicity of actions,
to discourage trivial lawsuits, and to prevent interference with the
314
It was applied in this case to
discretion of public authorities.”
protect defendants from the only meaningful action that could be
brought to correct the subsistence injury.
Though a private claimant who suffers an injury different from
the public-at-large can bring suit to correct a public nuisance, Judge
Holland chose the narrow version of this rule—the difference must
be not only in degree but in kind—and then reasoned that the Natives’ subsistence-culture claim was common to the public, taking
judicial notice “of the fact that hunting and fishing for the family
315
table is traditional throughout all of rural America.” The court
likened the subsistence lifestyle to hunting and fishing à la Daniel
Boone and noted that, “all Alaskans, and not just Alaska Natives,
307. Id. The Native Corporations settled their lawsuit with the TAPF for
$23.27 million and with Alyeska for $5.69 million. Id. A subsequent jury verdict
against Exxon for $5.9 million in damages to land and archaeological resources
was offset by the TAPF and Alyeska payment. See Chenega Corp. v. Exxon, 991
P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999).
308. Panoff, supra note 305, at 704.
309. Id.
310. See Bardwick, supra note 126, at 278.
311. Panoff, supra note 305, at 703–04.
312. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1994 WL 182856, at *1 (D. Alaska
Mar. 23, 1994) (unreported).
313. Id. at *2.
314. W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 2.2, at 36
(Vol. 1, West 1986) (footnotes omitted). See also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L. Q.
755 (2001).
315. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at *2.
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have the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated
nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychologi316
cal benefits in pristine natural surroundings.” According to Judge
Holland, neither the length of time in which Alaska Natives have
practiced subsistence nor the manner in which they practice it
317
makes their lifestyle sufficiently unique.
In dicta, the court drove the final nail in the coffin of Alaska
Native subsistence claims by concluding that the degradation of the
Native subsistence lifestyle began well in advance of the oil spill:
We are powerless to prevent change; and accidents are no
stranger to human existence. . . . However, one’s culture—a person’s way of life—is deeply embedded in the mind and heart.
Even catastrophic cultural impacts cannot change what is in the
mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a given way
of life. If (and we think this is not the case) the Native culture
was in such distress that the Exxon Valdez oil spill sapped the
will of the Native peoples to carry on their way of life, then a Native subsistence lifestyle was already lost before March 24,
318
1989.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court without hesitation, agreeing that the non-economic cultural claims were “potentially different in degree” but not “different in kind” from the inju319
ries suffered by other Alaskans. Natives could not sue to correct
the cultural wrongs any more than the EVOS Trustee Council
could move to correct them. All dissent was buried in law jour320
nals and in the disappointments of the Native people who had
been turned away. Exxon “won” millions in damage forgiveness
for its remorse; the Natives got nothing for their distress. Triggering the Reopener Clause could alleviate some of this suffering by
allocating an additional $100 million to aid the recovery of species
and habitat the Alaska Natives rely on for their subsistence way of
life.
6. The Slow Decline in Punitive Damages.
a. 5 Billion to 4 Billion to 4.5 Billion. The punitive damages phase of the Exxon Valdez case was born in a creative flourish

316. Id.
317. Id. (“These attributes of the Alaska Native lifestyle only make it different
in degree from the same subsistence lifestyle available to all Alaskans.”).
318. Id. at *4.
319. In re Native Class, 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997).
320. E.g., Bardwick, supra note 126, at 281.
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that gives high hope to students of law.321 It has slowly succumbed
to the more cynical details of the legal process.
The proceedings to assess punitive damages began with the
certification of a mandatory punitive damages class in 1994 under
322
The class included all persons
the direction of Judge Holland.
who possessed or asserted claims for punitive damages against
323
The formation of one punitive damages class was done
Exxon.
324
primarily for legal efficiency and equality. It insured that Exxon
would not be punished numerous times and that all plaintiffs could
325
recover damages. On May 2, 1994, the federal trial commenced.
In Phase 1 of the three-part trial, the jury unanimously found that
both Captain Hazelwood and Exxon recklessly caused the acci326
dent. In Phase 2, the jury returned a verdict awarding compensa327
tory damages of $287 million for losses relating to the spill. On
September 16, 1994, the verdict for Phase 3, assessing punitive
328
damages, resulted in an award of $5 billion. After the verdict was
announced, the plaintiff’s lawyer hugged his three-year old son as
an attorney for Exxon whispered, “he’ll be in college before you
329
get any of that money.” So far, those words have been prophetic,
330
as Exxon has not paid any of the punitive damages awarded.
331
The punitive damages case reached the Ninth Circuit in 1999.
In the interim, Exxon filed “more than 60 petitions and appeals,
sought 23 time extensions and filed more than 1,000 motions,
briefs, requests and demands,” requesting a reduction in the damages amount, a reversal, and a new trial, while also claiming jury
332
misconduct and jury tampering. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit va333
The lower
cated and remanded the punitive damages award.
321. See LEBEDOFF, supra note 236, passim.
322. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 158.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 160.
325. Id.
326. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1080 (D. Alaska 1994).
327. Id.
328. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 192.
329. Mark Curriden, Exxon Finds Slow Pace of Valdez Case Profitable: Company Says Fairness, Not Money, Is the Issue, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 14,
1999, at A1.
330. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 192; see also Gargi Chakrabarty,
Protests Aim to Exxpose Exxon, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jul. 13, 2005, at 7B
(protesters angry that Exxon has not paid all punitives; Exxon argues that punitive
award is excessive).
331. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
332. Curriden, supra note 329, at A1.
333. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1254.
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court was ordered to apply the three “guideposts” set out by the
Supreme Court in BMW of North America v. Gore334: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the victim and the
amount of punitive damages awarded; and (3) the comparison between the punitives and other criminal or civil penalties authorized
335
by law or imposed in like cases. In applying this test, the Ninth
Circuit found, first, because the spill was an accident and Exxon
acted promptly to mitigate its effects, its reprehensibility was re336
Second, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
duced.
was seventeen-to-one, which exceeded the four-to-one ratio the
Supreme Court called “close to the line” in Pacific Mutual Life In337
surance Co. v. Haslip. Finally, the Court determined that the punitive damages award far exceeded other comparable penalties and
338
those allowable under the Oil Pollution Act. Based on these factors, the district court was ordered to reduce the amount of puni339
tive damages.
The district court reevaluated the amount of punitive damages
awarded and determined that $5 billion did not violate due process
340
as described in BMW v. Gore. In applying the Gore factors, the
341
court found that Exxon’s conduct was highly reprehensible. Also,
in its calculation, the court fixed the ratio of punitive harm to quantifiable damages at 9.85-to-1, which does not exceed the ten-to-one
ratio upheld in TXO Production Corp v. Alliance Resources
342
Corp. The court calculated the amount of quantifiable damages
by adding up all the payments made by Exxon, to arrive at an
343
amount of “actual harm” equal to $507,509,094. Judge Holland
totaled twenty-one awards, payments, and settlements to reach this
344
figure. Finally, the court determined that the penalty was appro-

334. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
335. Id. at 574–75.
336. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1243.
337. Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
338. Id. at 1241–46.
339. Id. at 1246–47.
340. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
341. Id. at 1057 (knowing that Captain Hazelwood was an alcoholic and drinking on duty, leaving him in command “demonstrated reckless disregard for the
livelihood, health, and safety of the residents of Prince William Sound, the crew of
the Exxon Valdez, and others”).
342. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)).
343. Id. at 1060.
344. Id. at 1058–60.
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priate based on comparable misconduct.345 Despite the ratio of punitive to actual harm falling within an acceptable limit, the court
found that the award had to be reduced to $4 billion to comply with
346
the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Exxon again appealed the amount
347
of the award.
In August 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the $4 billion punitive damages judgment and remanded the case to the district court
to reconsider the punitive damages award in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
348
In reassessing actual harm yet again, Judge Holland
Campbell.
considered twenty-four awards, payments, and settlements, to
349
reach a total of $513,147,740. In January 2004 the district court
held that the imposition of $5 billion in punitive damages would not
violate the State Farm principle that punitive damages could not be
used to punish and deter a defendant for conduct that happened in
another jurisdiction (following the rule that a court may not consider extraterritorial conduct that has no nexus to the harm suf350
fered by plaintiffs). The court also found that the punitive award
351
Fiof $5 billion would not violate Exxon’s due process rights.
nally, Judge Holland reduced the award to $4.5 billion, again to
352
comply with the Ninth Circuit’s remand order.
b. The Seattle Seven Interlude. A telling component of
this litigation involves claims brought by the “Seattle Seven,” a
353
On January 8, 1991, the Seattle
group of seafood processors.
Seven entered into a confidential $70 million settlement with
354
Exxon. In exchange for $70 million, the Seattle Seven agreed to
release their claims against Exxon and “take all reasonable, lawful
and ethical . . . actions to assist Exxon so that Exxon may recapture
or obtain a credit or offset for any punitive damages, awards, set-

345. Id. at 1061.
346. Id. at 1068.
347. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075, 1084–85 (D. Alaska 2004).
348. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003)).
349. Id. at 1099–1101.
350. Id. at 1090–91.
351. Id. at 1110.
352. Id.
353. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 201–04 (discussing In re Exxon
Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1996 WL 384623, at *7 (D. Alaska June 11, 1996), aff’d,
No. 97-35208 DC, 1998 WL 536878 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998)).
354. Id. at 201–02.
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tlements, and claims.”355 They agreed to challenge the “Plan of Allocation” of punitive damages and to use their share to reimburse
356
The payoff, if successful, would be
Exxon (over $700 million).
$12 million. The district court rejected this secret agreement on
357
public policy grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the cede-back provisions were enforceable but should not be
358
disclosed to the jury.
Exxon has done everything legally possible to delay its payment of the awarded punitive damages. This litigation effort was
tortured in the appellate process and by Exxon’s questionable mo359
tives. Six times Exxon went to the Ninth Circuit, which resulted
in six wins for Exxon. The district court’s most recent order, setting punitive damages at $4.5 billion, is pending a hearing before
the court of appeals. By delaying its payment, Exxon continues to
accrue interest on its debt to society, limiting the impact of the punitive damages as a means of punishing and deterring reckless behavior.
E. Double Hulls and Margins of Tolerance
The Oil Pollution Act was a response to the tragedy of the
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Congress did much to fix the deficiencies that were on conspicuous display post-EVOS: it even took
steps to redesign petroleum tankers by the simple expedient of
360
mandating double hulls in tanker design and construction.
Congress thought it had discovered a silver-bullet solution
with this technological change. Exxon, on the other hand, fought
imposition of such a requirement throughout the legislative proc361
ess. In the Senate, efforts to mandate double hulls were narrowly
362
defeated. In the House, a provision compelled double hulls to be
363
phased-in over fifteen years, and a phase-out of single hull tank-

355. Id.
356. Id. at 202.
357. See In re Exxon Valdez, 1996 WL 384623, at *12.
358. See In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2000).
359. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 205–08. While Exxon asserts that
it is just “exercising [its] legal right[s] to appeal an unjust verdict,” critics point out
that Exxon maintains control of the penalty and can invest it to realize a higher
rate of return than the federally mandated 5.9%. See 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later,
supra note 249.
360. See Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent,
and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10119, 10119 (March 1991).
361. Id. at 10132.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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ers was to begin in 1995. By 2010, all vessels over 5,000 gross tons
with single hulls are to be prohibited from operating until con364
The Congressional margin of
verted to double hulled vessels.
tolerance for double hulls was twenty years. This requirement has
had no impact on Exxon traffic in Prince William Sound since the
365
1989 spill.
Double hulls were “a road not taken” in the 1990 OPA, and it
is a road that beckons again during the 2002-2006 Reopener window. The Sound could be significantly protected if every penny of
the Reopener’s $100 million were sent back to Exxon with instructions to invest it in putting double hulls on its tanker fleet that
moves Valdez oil.
III. THE ROAD TO BE TAKEN: APPLYING THE REOPENER
A. Legal Conditions
To trigger the Reopener, it is necessary to demonstrate that:
(1) “populations, habitats, or species” have suffered losses or declines in the area of the spill; (2) these losses are “substantial”; (3)
the losses must result from the oil spill; (4) the losses could not
have been reasonably known or anticipated by the trustees; (5) restoration projects must be identifiable and set forth in a “restoration
plan”; and (6) the costs of any project “must not be grossly disproportionate to the magnitude of the benefits anticipated from the
366
remediation.”
1. Have “One or More Populations, Habitats, or Species” Suffered a “Substantial Loss or Substantial Decline in the Areas Affected by the Oil Spill”? The short answer to this question is that
many populations, habitats, and species have suffered losses and
declines in Prince William Sound, and these declines have been
substantial. For example, an impressive summary of consequences
appeared in a 2003 Science article, which concluded powerfully:
[O]il persisted beyond a decade in surprising amounts and in
toxic forms, was sufficiently bioavailable to induce chronic bio-

364. Id.
365. See Eric Nalder, Safety Lapses Plague Tankers: Post-Exxon Valdez
Changes in Oil Carrier Operations Are Being Evaded, Undermined, P-I Investigation Shows, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 2005, at A1, A6, (Conoco
“endorsed double hulls immediately after the Exxon Valdez spill and built
them. . . . By contrast, Exxon’s fleet hasn’t launched any new double-hulled ships
for the Alaska trade and, under the law, it might not be able to sail its old ships
into Prince William Sound . . . in about two years.”).
366. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 19.
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logical exposures, and had long-term impacts at the population
level. Three major pathways of induction of long-term impacts
emerge: (i) chronic persistence of oil, biological exposures, and
population impacts to species closely associated with shallow
sediments; (ii) delayed population impacts of sublethal doses
compromising health, growth, and reproduction; and (iii) indirect effects of trophic and interaction cascades, all 367
of which
transmit impacts well beyond the acute-phase mortality.

In layman’s terms, the article concluded that populations,
habitats, and species continue to be exposed to oil in toxic amounts
in Prince William Sound, and these exposures compromise the
health, growth, and reproduction of individual animals with resultant population effects. There is scientific documentation of these
losses across the species that populate the Sound; elaboration of
the oil spill’s effects on a few selected species and environments is
supplied below.
2. How to Measure “Substantial” Declines in Populations,
Habitats, or Species?
a. Generally. The test of whether the environmental
damages fall below a legally acceptable norm is inescapable in environmental law and crucial to the resolution of the Exxon Valdez
368
369
Reopener. The common law of nuisance and public trust measures violation by reference to whether an injury is “substantial.”
The Endangered Species Act and CERCLA (to mention two examples) demand somewhat different levels of improvement to the
environmental baseline—the first, at which listed species are fully
370
“recovered,” and the second, at which human health is fully pro371
tected.
Contestants in the Exxon Valdez litigation have used different
standards of recovery at different times. The EVOS Trustee Council first defined recovery as “a return to pre-spill conditions or to
372
conditions comparable to those of unoiled areas.” On the other
side, Exxon’s Alan W. Maki has invoked indicators such as noeffects exposure levels and successful survival, reproduction, and

367. Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 302 SCIENCE 2082, 2082 (2003) [hereinafter Ecosystem Response].
368. W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, Vol. 1, §§ 2.4,
2.5 (1986).
369. Id. § 2.20.
370. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000) (recovery plans).
371. See W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES &
SUBSTANCES, Vol. 4, § 8.10 (1992).
372. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35.
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re-colonization of oiled areas to confirm that “biological recovery is
rapidly taking place.”373
The 1991 settlement rests on the Clean Water Act, which directs public trustees to “restore, rehabilitate or acquire the equiva374
By dictionary definition, “restore”
lent” of natural resources.
means to “bring back to an original condition” or to “bring back
375
“Rehabilitate” means “to restore . . . to
into existence or use.”
376
useful life” or “to restore to a former state or condition.”
“Equivalent” means “practically equal” or “having virtually identi377
cal or corresponding parts.”
Some commentators have formally defined recovery as “the
return of an impacted ecosystem to its pre-spill state, structurally
and/or functionally, within the limits and constraints of natural
378
variability and statistical significance, respectively.” This definition is further broken down into structural recovery (“return of
physical and chemical habitat characteristics to pre-spill conditions
within the limits of natural variability”), functional recovery (“return of biological processes and species assemblages to pre-spill
conditions within the limits of natural variability”), and resource
services recovery (“return of services provided by public resources . . . to pre-spill levels within the limits of expected variabil379
ity”).
We will follow this last approach, because we are confident
that a resource must meet pre-spill conditions to be “recovered”
and that there are five criteria (health, habitat, numbers, diversity,
and ecological functions) for determining whether pre-spill condi380
tions are met.
373. See Alan W. Maki, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Initial Environmental Impact Assessment, 25 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 24, 29 (1991) (analyzing petroleum hydrocarbon levels and counting animals, thus concluding recovery is occurring); see
also John A. Wiens, Oil, Seabirds, and Science: The Effects of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 46 BIO-SCIENCE 587, 594 (1996) (“Recovery should instead be defined
statistically, as the disappearance of a previously documented significant relationship between a population and a measure of initial oil exposure.”).
374. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000).
375. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1054 (2d College ed. 1982).
376. Id. at 1042.
377. Id. at 462.
378. Donald A. Wickham et al., Restoration: The Goal of the Oil Pollution Act
Natural Resource Damage Actions, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 405, 418 (1993); see also
Heidi Wendel, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1991).
379. Wickham et al., supra note 378, at 419.
380. Cf. NOAA Fisheries, Viable Salmonid Populations, http://www.nwr.noaa.
gov/1salmon/salmesa/4ddocs/4dwsvps.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
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We recognize that any attempt to define recovery using a prespill baseline is inherently problematic because of “the grossly inadequate state of knowledge of environmental baseline condi381
tions” and the inability to define such a thing as “pre-injury” conditions given that “change, variability, disturbance, and succession
are parts of every environment, whether influenced by humans or
382
Therefore, whether we look for recovery by comparing
not.”
oiled versus non-oiled area conditions or whether we attempt to
compare pre- and post-spill indicators such as health, habitat, numbers, diversity, and ecological function, we may in either case find
ourselves assuming too much (in terms of establishing the baseline)
or questioning the causation of the changes we are observing (natural or human-made).
The 2002 EVOS Restoration Plan Update on Injured Resources and Services identifies recovery objectives for spillimpacted resources and services. These objectives are intended to
be measurable conditions that signal recovery—for each of the species and habitats of concern, the Plan uses these objectives as
383
“yardsticks” to determine whether recovery has been achieved.
Would these same results be found using more specific indicators
such as health, habitat, numbers, diversity, and ecological function
for these species or communities?
b.

A Partial List: As Applied.

(i). Orcas. No better example of the enduring—thus substantial—ecological loss can be found than the tragedy of the transient killer whales in the AT1 pod. Extinction, they say, is forever,
and forever is a long time to wait for “restoration.”
The AT1 pod of transient, mammal-eating, killer whales has
384
declined by at least 50% since the Exxon Valdez spill. Originally
numbering twenty-two animals, the pod currently consists of seven
381. David G. Shaw & Harry R. Bader, Environmental Science in a Legal Context: The Exxon Valdez Experience, 25 AMBIO 430, 432 (1996).
382. Id.
383. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 1; see
also EVOS Trustee Council Application to the Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Large
Ecosystem Level Project Decision Support Systems Questionnaire, available at
http://www.iep.water.ca.gov/cmarp/groups/dartwt/largescale/evos.doc (last visited
Oct. 16, 2005).
384. Doug O’Harra, Dying Killer Whale Family Wins Protection, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 4, 2004, at A1; see also News Release, NOAA Fisheries,
NOAA Fisheries Proposes Depleted Designation for Prince William Sound Killer
Whales (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/newsreleases/2003/AT1killerwhale.htm.

110805 02_RODGERS.DOC

192

1/3/2006 4:49 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[22:2

whales and has not produced a viable calf in over twenty years.385
Prior to the oil spill, the twenty-two AT1 transients had been
sighted on an annual or biennial basis and appeared in Prince William Sound year-round, a sighting regularity that is rare for tran386
sient animals. Despite this dramatic decline—coinciding with the
387
oil spill—and despite expert opinion, the Council insists there is
388
no evidence linking the oil spill to the AT1 group’s decline.
Following the oil spill, several members of the AT1 group
were photographed swimming through oiled waters near the Exxon
389
Valdez. In a report prepared for the EVOS Trustee Council, killer whale researchers Craig Matkin and Eva Saulitis stated:
Most of the missing AT1 whales apparently disappeared during
the 1989-90 winter. We suspect that they died from the protracted effects of either inhaling oil or oil vapors or as a result of
extensive feeding on heavily oiled harbor seals. Oiled seals were
lethargic and may have provided an easy source of food for these
390
whales following the spill.

Additional impacts from the oil spill may include the decline in
391
harbor seals and the extremely high levels of contaminants found
392
in the blubber of the AT1 whales. The contaminants consist of
assorted PCB compounds as well as DDT and its breakdown com393
ponents; scientists are concerned that the contaminants will affect
the whales’ reproductive success. The combination of contaminants and the decreased prey population may prevent the AT1
394
group from recovering, perhaps so much so that future recovery
395
is impossible. In short, the AT1 orca pod fails all criteria for re-

385. O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1. The AT1 pod has been listed as depleted
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Id. Reproductive failure in this pod
preceded the spill. See id.
386. CRAIG MATKIN & EVA SAULITIS, KILLER WHALE (ORCINUS ORCA) 3, 6–7
(EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Notebook Series 1997), http://www.evostc.
state.ak.us/pdf/mkiwh.pdf.
387. See id. at 10.
388. EVOS Trustee Council, Status of Injured Resources—Killer Whale,
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/status_orca.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
389. See O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1.
390. MATKIN & SAULITIS, supra note 386, at 10.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. Id.
394. See id.
395. O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1 (quoting Dr. James Balsiger, NOAA Fisheries, Alaska Regional Fisheries Administrator, “The number of animals in this
group has dramatically decreased since 1989 to the point where this particular
stock of killer whales may disappear from the ocean.”).
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covery because it is on its way to extinction. The EVOS Trustee
Council lists the harbor seal as “not recovering.”396 The orca who
prey on the seal are “not recovering” either. This sad story is a regrettable residue of the 1989 oil spill.
(ii). Steller Sea Lions. The EVOS Council does not in397
clude the Steller sea lion as an “injured resource.” However, the
western stock of Steller sea lions has declined drastically since the
1970s; it is estimated the population fell 40% between 1990 and
398
The stock is listed as endangered under the Endangered
2000.
399
Although Prince William Sound does not contain
Species Act.
rookeries (terrestrial breeding and pupping sites), there are two
400
haul-out sites used year-round and three used on a seasonal basis.
Twenty-five more haul-outs outside of Prince William Sound were
401
in the path of the oil spill.
Direct impacts to Steller sea lions from the oil spill appeared
to be minimal; scientists did not find conclusive evidence of an ef402
fect from the oil spill on the population. Nonetheless, recent research demonstrates that herring are the most important winter
403
forage item for Steller sea lions in the Sound, and, as discussed
below, the herring fishery has not recovered from the spill. It is
probable that the decline in herring availability combined with
other ecosystem changes from the oil spill has contributed to the
decline of the Steller sea lion in Prince William Sound—more research would be required to find the causes and effects. Nonetheless, it is clear the Steller sea lion population has waned and should
be recognized as “not recovered” by the EVOS Council.
(iii). Pacific Herring. Pacific herring are deemed “not re404
covering” by the Trustee Council. This species has failed to meet
its EVOS recovery objective: it “will have recovered when the next
396. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 11.
397. See id. at 3.
398. NOAA Fisheries, 2002 Stock Assessment, Steller Sea Lion: Western U.S.
Stock 2, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/PR2/Stock_Assessment_Program/Pinnipeds/
Steller_(West)/AK02stellerseallion_West.pdf.
399. Id at 7.
400. Donald G. Calkins et al., Impacts on Steller Sea Lions, in MARINE
MAMMALS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ 119, 119–20 (Thomas R. Loughlin, ed., 1994).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 137.
403. See G.L. Thomas & R.E. Thorne, Acoustical-optical Assessment of Pacific
Herring and Their Predator Assemblage in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 16
AQUATIC LIVING RESOURCES 247, 247 (2003).
404. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 17.
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highly successful year-class is recruited into the population and
when other indicators of population health (such as biomass, sizeat-age, and disease expression) are within normal bounds in Prince
405
William Sound.”
This crucial species fails each of our five tests for recovery: (1)
its numbers are down, (2) its habitat is poisoned, (3) its health is
bad, (4) its distribution is limited, and (5) its diversity is in jeopardy. For these reasons, it cannot serve as the main prey item in
many complex food webs.
First, herring numbers are dramatically down since before the
oil spill. The population of spawning herring was depressed
through 1995; in 1997 and 1998, spawning numbers doubled those
of 1994 (the year after the crash) and suggested recovery had be406
Limited harvests were thus permitted in 1997-1998.407 In
gun.
1999, the EVOS Trustee Council considered Pacific herring to be
408
Regrettably, “in the last several years the recovery
recovering.
has stalled and the population has yet to recruit a highly successful
409
Evidence in
yearclass [sic], which is fundamental to recovery.”
2003 suggested a class of juveniles could recruit into the adult
stocks; if these fish do not trigger a disease outbreak, they could
start to rebuild the Sound’s herring population and again spark re410
411
covery. However, the fishery remains closed through 2006. Until a class recruits, Pacific herring “can only be considered to be not
412
recovering from the effects of the oil spill.”
Dr. Riki Ott has identified habitat and health factors that
originated with the spill:
The Sound’s herring population has had problems since the spill.
At a minimum, oil exposure in 1989 killed lipid-rich eggs, incubating along oiled beaches; maimed and killed embryos adrift in
surface waters; and reduced fertility in survivors of the 1989
year-class. PAH exposure also may have wreaked havoc with
the immune system of surviving 1989 year-class and adults, making them more susceptible to diseases . . . . The herring stocks
collapsed in Prince William Sound and nowhere else in the state
in 1993, the year that survivors of the ill-fated 1989 year-class

405. Id. at 16.
406. Id. at 17.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.; see also OTT, supra note 3, at 379.
411. Alaska Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, Prince William Sound Herring Announcement #1, http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region2/finfish/herring/pws/pwsupd
05.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
412. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 17.
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matured and joined the adult stocks. Viral outbreaks decimated
413
the Sound’s remaining herring stocks again in 1998 and 2001.

Herring disease assessment has been conducted by the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game (“ADFG”) since 1993. In April
2004, ADFG examined herring for prevalence of focal skin redden414
The prevalence of
ing and the pathogen Ichthyophonus hoferi.
reddening was low but the prevalence of I. hoferi was relatively
high (14%) and consistent with the increasing age of the dominant
415
1999 age-class. The ADFG concluded, “[I]f this trend continues,
416
mortality of the dominant age class may increase significantly.”
Exposure to Exxon Valdez oil has been shown to compromise the
417
immune systems of adult herring.
The herring habitat was contaminated by the spill and remains
contaminated. In the opinion of one herring researcher, because
herring depend on the edge zone of Prince William Sound, “they
will remain at risk for as long as there is toxicity from oil in that
418
region.” The habitat for herring continues to impact this species
negatively, due to residual oil causing instability in the plants that
419
make up this habitat.
In short, the science shows an increased incidence of pathogens (and a surprising genetic disparity between Prince William
420
This may be
Sound herring and other nearby herring stocks).
problematic. Herring are a keystone species, whose activities and
abundances can determine the integrity and stability of a complex
421
ecosystem.
413. OTT, supra note 3, at 379 (references omitted).
414. Alaska Department of Fish and Wildlife, Prince William Sound Herring
Announcement #1, supra note 411.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 16.
418. OTT, supra note 3, at 291.
419. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13.
420. Another example of EVOS effects: In 1994, the Trustee Council commissioned a four-year study of genetic differences of herring within and adjacent to
Prince William Sound, and between year classes within and adjacent to the Sound.
The results showed a large genetic discontinuity between herring from the Gulf of
Alaska and the Bering Sea and between specific locations within Prince William
Sound, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Bering Sea. The study also revealed significant
inter-annual variation at locations sampled in successive years within Prince William Sound. See JAMES E. SEEB ET AL., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION OF PRINCE
WILLIAM SOUND HERRING POPULATIONS FINAL REPORT 2 (1999), available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf final_reports/165.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
421. See R.T.Paine, A Note on Trophic Complexity and Community Stability,
103 AM. NATURALIST 91, 92 (1969).
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Few species are of greater combined ecological and economic
importance in Prince William Sound (and in many other coastal
ecosystems) than is the Pacific Herring . . . central to a marine
food web that includes humpback whales, harbor seals, a large
variety of marine and shore birds, bald eagles, jellyfish and other
invertebrates, and an array of other fishes, such as pollock. In
addition, herring – especially their eggs – provide a multi-million
dollar resource that is available to commercial fishers in the
422
spring, before the main salmon seasons open.

The delay in recovery of Pacific herring is a likely factor in the
delay in recovery of other species. Reopener funds could be useful
in finding ways to assist the herring population in recovery.
The chief difficulty in assessing EVOS responsibility for the
herring is the substantial natural variability in herring populations.
This makes it “impossible” to know what a population or commu423
nity would have been like “in the absence of the spill.” But surely
NRD provisions of law are not rendered inoperative by natural
variability. Exxon’s restoration standard of a normally functioning
ecosystem is not met in the case of herring; it is insufficiently ambitious because “judging recovery solely by criteria of ecosystem
function minimizes the significance of specific biological detail such
424
as species density and age structure.”
(iv). Intertidal Communities. The EVOS Council says that
“Intertidal Communities” are recovering in the wake of the spill425
426
and has its own criteria for ascertaining full recovery. The intertidal zone is comprised of beaches and nearshore, sub-tidal areas
that play a vital role in maintaining the ecosystem of Prince Wil427
If this regime is not recovered—and it is not—the
liam Sound.
legal case for the Reopener is established.
422. See EVELYN D. BROWN & MARK G. CARLS, PACIFIC HERRING (CLUPEA
PALLASI) 1, (EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Notebook Series 1998),
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/rnpahe.pdf.
423. R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons from the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 27 ANN. R. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 197, 205 (1996).
424. Id.
425. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13.
426. Id. at 12–13. The EVOS recovery objective is that important species have
been reestablished, “the differences in community composition and organism
abundance on oiled and unoiled shorelines are no longer apparent . . . and the
intertidal and nearshore habitats provide adequate, uncontaminated food supplies
for top predators.” Id. at 13.
427. OTT, supra note 3, at 202. The intertidal rockweed and subtidal eelgrass
and kelp forests provide food and shelter for a large variety of smaller organisms
(e.g., small bottom-dwelling fish, mussels, snails, clams, marine worms, sea stars,
sea urchins, small crabs, and other crustaceans). These species serve as food for

110805 02_RODGERS.DOC

2005]

1/3/2006 4:49 PM

EXXON VALDEZ REOPENER

197

Twelve years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Alaska Fisheries Science Center conducted a study and found, quite amazingly,
that Exxon Valdez oil was highly persistent: “Although the volume
of oil has declined considerably, our study suggests the area of
428
oiled beach has probably changed little since 1992.” This oil persistence study found oil on seventy-eight out of ninty-one beaches
429
selected randomly based on previous exposure to EVOS oil. The
study evaluated an area of 11.3 hectares and estimated “conservatively” that there were 55,600 kilograms of subsurface oil remain430
ing. “These results indicate that oil from the Exxon Valdez remains by far the largest reservoir of biologically available polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons on beaches impacted by the spill and that
431
biota dependent on these beaches risk continued exposure.”
The spill impacted portions of the 1,400 mile coastline in
Prince William Sound, on the Kenai and Alaska peninsulas, and in
432
The flora and fauna of the intertidal
the Kodiak Archipelago.
zone suffered significant impacts from the spilled oil and the subse433
Within a few years, algal coverage and
quent clean-up efforts.
invertebrate populations returned to densities and abundances like
434
those observed in unoiled areas. Despite this recovery, there continues to be large fluctuations in algal coverage in the areas im435
pacted by the oil spill. Specifically, Fucus gardneri populations (a
perennial brown seaweed known as rockweed or popweed that
dominates the intertidal) continue to be unstable as a result of the
436
spill and more recent natural events. Additionally, through 1997,
many larger predators. In addition, the intertidal areas provide vital foraging,
nursery, and spawning habitat for numerous aquatic, avian, and terrestrial species.
Id.
428. See Jeffrey W. Short et al., Estimate of Oil Persisting on the Beaches of
Prince William Sound 12 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 38 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 19, 24 (2004).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 19. “Analysis of terpanes indicated that over 90% of the surface oil
and all of the subsurface oil was from the Exxon Valdez.” Id.
431. Id.
432. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 12.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 13.
435. Id.
436. Id.; see also W.B. Driskell et al., Long Term Signal of Disturbance: Fucus
Gardneri After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 11 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 815
(2001) (“Broad-scale (and probably recurrent) oscillations in Fucus cover suggest
that authentic recovery cannot simply be defined as the reappearance of a species
or assemblage at its former abundance. Instead, the dynamics of the system in
terms of both spatial and temporal variability must fall within a range of natural

110805 02_RODGERS.DOC

198

1/3/2006 4:49 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[22:2

studies have confirmed that populations of invertebrate mollusks
and annelid worms on oiled and washed beaches are much less
437
abundant than those on comparable unoiled beaches.
In comparing oiled sites with unoiled reference sites, scientists
documented a reduced abundance of many species of algae and
438
invertebrates in areas impacted by the spill. For example, the oil
spill contributed to a reduced abundance and reproductive potential of the common seaweed, Fucus gardneri, and its place was superceded by “more opportunistic” species such as barnacles, oli439
gochaete worms, and filamentous brown algae.
Intertidal communities are ecologically important and serve as
subsistence resources for a variety of species, including sea and
river otters, black oystercatchers, harlequin ducks, and pigeon guil440
Of critical importance to intertidal communities is the
lemots.
full recovery of Fucus gardneri populations, which provide cover
441
Fucus’ recovery has been
for many invertebrate populations.
hindered by the unexpected persistence of subsurface Exxon Val442
dez oil in the middle and lower intertidal zones.
Based on the lack of full recovery of some soft-sediment intertidal invertebrates and the role of residual oil in initiating Fucus
population instability, the intertidal communities are not recovered.
(v). Sea Otters. Sea Otters are deemed “recovering” in
443
the August 2002 Status Report. They are not recovered. Though
the total number of sea otters killed by the oil spill is unknown,
444
acute loss is estimated in the range of several thousand. The sea
otter population is probably increasing today in Prince William
445
But sea otters in the most heavily oiled areas still face
Sound.

variation.”); R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 221 (“Exxon’s assessment of Fucus recovery . . . is statistically correct yet biologically flawed”).
437. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13.
438. Id. at 12.
439. Id. at 13.
440. Id. at 12.
441. Id. at 13.
442. See Short et al., supra note 428, at 25.
443. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 20.
444. Brenda E. Ballachey et al., An Overview of Sea Otter Studies, in MARINE
MAMMALS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ 47, 56 (1994).
445. R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 218 (“[a]lthough doubt may remain
about the time course to recovery because of both chronic effects of oil and possible disease introduction from the intensive rehabilitation efforts”).
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significant recovery problems.446 Knight Island, which suffered
heavy oiling and the highest otter mortalities after the spill, showed
no increase in the population as of 2000, due to low juvenile sur447
vival rates. Oil persists on the beaches and is ingested by the otters during foraging activities; “progress toward recovery . . . is evident, but that in areas where initial oil effects were greatest, recovery may be constrained by residual spill effects, resulting from ele448
Until the sea otters begin to
vated mortality and emigration.”
recover in the areas most severely impacted by the spill, the population should not be listed as “recovered” by the EVOS Council.
The sea otter is a keystone species because it helps keep other
449
species under control in nearshore communities. Given the importance of the intertidal community to the health of sea otters,
and the critical importance of sea otters in the Prince William
Sound ecosystem, it is clear that this species cannot be considered
fully recovered from the effects of the oil spill. More effort needs
to be taken to speed the otters’ resurgence.
3. Are These Losses “As a Result” of the Oil Spill? All losses
depicted above—and many more not discussed here—are linked to
the oil spill. The Peterson study of long-term ecosystem responses
shows how far the science of oil-spill causation has progressed since
450
For some species, lingering consequences show up as
1989.
health effects; for others, population numbers are down. For the
orcas of Pod AT1, the “result” of the oil spill may very well be ex451
tinction.
For many species, the habitat that was lost to the oil spill re452
mains lost. A 2004 study sponsored by the EVOS Trustee Coun446. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 20
(“The lack of recovery may reflect the extended time required for population
growth for a long-lived mammal with a low reproductive rate, but it also could
reflect the effects of continuing exposure to hydrocarbons, or a combination of
both factors.”).
447. J.L. Bodkin et al., Sea Otter Population Status and the Process of Recovery
from the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 241 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES
237, 250 (2002); see also R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 218 (highly critical of
the official response to the distress of sea otters: “little seems to have been learned
of significance for the conservation, restoration, and especially management of this
ecologically conspicuous species”).
448. Id. at 237.
449. James A. Estes & John F. Palmisano, Sea Otters: Their Role in Structuring
Nearshore Communities, 185 SCIENCE 1058, 1059–60 (1974).
450. See generally Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082–86.
451. Id. at 2085.
452. Short et al., supra note 428, at 19.
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cil “found some form of oil at 86% of the beaches [visited] and on
93% of the combined beaches of categories I and II.”453 The study
used a random sampling approach “to provide a quantitative,
454
probability-based estimate of the amount of oil remaining.” The
study sampled three categories of beaches: (I) those that were
“heavily oiled” at any time during the period from 1990–93; (II)
those that were “moderately oiled” at any time during the same
period; and (III) those that were heavily oiled in 1989 but had only
455
light or no oil impact during subsequent years. The total length
of beach sampled was 116.6 kilometers (approximately 72.5
456
A grid was laid out on each beach tested and was
miles).
457
searched visually for evidence of surface oil. Each oil patch was
then classified according to types like “asphalt pavement/mousse,”
458
“surface oil residue,” “tar balls,” “coat,” or “oil film.” Oil visually evident within the uppermost five centimeters (two inches) of a
459
beach surface was considered “surface oil.” Test pits were dug to
a depth of 0.5 meters (1.6 feet) to evaluate the presence of subsur460
face oil. Chemical analyses of oil found were compared to chemical “fingerprints” of Exxon Valdez oil, and to samples originating
from known contamination released during the 1964 earthquake
461
(“Monterey Formation” asphalt).
The results of the study show that the distribution of detected
462
Segments
oil among the sampled beaches was highly variable.
that were within sheltered embayments receiving the brunt of the
463
initial oil landfall were the most heavily impacted. Persistent oil
was also found on beaches with surface armoring of boulder or
cobble, nearly level slopes of the middle intertidal, or a bedrock
464
platform overlaid with sediment veneer. Again, some form of oil
was found at nearly 90% of the beaches visited, and on over 90%
465
Surface oil was found in all
of the category I and II beaches.

453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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three categories.466 The estimate of beach area contaminated by
467
subsurface oil was 7.8 hectares (19.3 acres).
Subsurface oil was most often found in the lower tidal eleva468
tions of the sampling grid. All of the subsurface oil was consistent with Exxon Valdez oil, and was usually less weathered than
469
Monterey Formation oil was usually found
surface oil samples.
above +3 meters (9.8 ft) tide height, typically in the form of flattened tar balls adhered to cobbles and boulders, or occasionally as
470
small tar mats. Petroleum derived from the Monterey Formation
was estimated to account for less than 10% of the surface oil en471
The researchers did not find evidence that the oil
countered.
found during the study originated from any other anthropogenic
472
sources.
The study suggested it underestimated the area of oil-con473
taminated beach. Though the volume of oil mass has fallen, this
study suggests that the area of oiled beach has changed only slightly
474
since 1992. “Although the oil remaining is only about 0.14-0.28%
of the volume originally beached, the decline was most rapid during
475
the first few years.” Subsequent annual loss is estimated to be 20476
26%, which is “substantially slower than anticipated.”
4. Could the Long-Term Adverse Effects Reasonably Be Anticipated by the Trustees? The state of knowledge at the time of the
Exxon Valdez settlement is best confirmed by the actions of the
principals; for instance, in 1991 Exxon assured Judge Holland that

466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 23.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 24.
472. Id.
473. Id. (the estimate was perhaps too low because it excluded “(i) tidal elevations lower than +1.8 m [5.9 ft], (ii) beaches described as lightly or moderately
oiled in 1989 but not thereafter, (iii) pit depths deeper than 0.5 m [1.6 ft], and (iv)
oil not evident visually or by odor”). The increasing frequency of oil encountered
from the upper (+4.8m/15.8 ft) to the mid- (+1.8 m/5.9 ft) intertidal elevation grid,
suggests that subsurface oil may be encountered within the lower intertidal nearly
as often as in the upper intertidal. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
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Prince William Sound was “well on the way” to recovery.477 The
Reopener was only a hedge against the improbable. Books would
later be written on how nature could quickly rebound from traumas
478
like the oil spill of the Exxon Valdez.
This confidence unraveled relatively quickly. The cascades of
unanticipated consequences came post-settlement, such as the 1992
and 1993 collapse of pink salmon runs, the first population collapse
of Pacific herring in 1993, the 2001 documentation of the extent of
479
buried oil, and a number of other developments.
The Trustee Council has admitted that many of the long-term
effects of the oil spill were not known (and could not have been
known) at the time of the settlement:
Many of the resources affected by the spill had limited or no recent data on their status in 1989. In addition, some of the available pertinent data was the result of limited sampling and had
wide ranges in the population estimates. Having such patchy
data on resources made it difficult to accurately assess initial injury . . . . Since the Exxon Valdez oil spill affected an area rich in
wildlife and was so well studied, it would not be surprising that
there are findings without precedent in the scientific literature on
oil effects. One example of such an unprecedented effect is the
sensitivity of Pacific herring
and pink salmon to low concentra480
tions of weathered oil.

Other examples are explained below. All of them support triggering the Reopener to combat the unanticipated and lingering effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
a. Lingering Unweathered Oil in the Intertidal Zone.
The study of the persistence of oil from the Exxon Valdez oil spill
described above is a dramatic example of an environmental impact
477. Alaska Action Network, Action Alert: 15 Years of Lingering Effects,
http://aknetwork.e-actionmax.com/showalert.asp?aaid=590 (last visited Oct. 27,
2005).
478. See, e.g., JEFF WHEELWRIGHT, DEGREES OF DISASTER: PRINCE WILLIAM
SOUND: HOW NATURE REELS AND REBOUNDS (1994).
479. See, e.g., Scott Allen, Deep Problems 10 Years After Exxon Valdez,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1999, at A1 (“But the deep scars, and the unfinished
business, of the Exxon Valdez disaster become clearer down on the water, where
only two of the 23 most damaged species have fully recovered and an estimated 40
percent of the fishermen suffer depression over their decimated livelihoods. . . .
True, some animals, such as bald eagles and, later, river otters, did seem to bounce
back quickly. However, scientists at the National Marine Fisheries Service say
Exxon’s claims are premature even now. Not only are some species, such as loons
and harlequin ducks, showing no signs of recovering, but new research suggests
that the Exxon Valdez spill may be killing today.”).
480. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 2.
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that was unexpected at the time of settlement. In the words of the
study’s authors: “The unexpected persistence of subsurface Exxon
Valdez oil, often only moderately weathered and extending into the
more biologically productive middle and lower intertidal, confirms
the potential for long-term biological effects after 1992 on beaches
481
Those “biological effects”
most heavily impacted by the spill.”
have been most obvious in pink salmon and Pacific herring.
b. 1992-1993 Collapse of the Pink Salmon Fishery. Although there had been record harvests of pink salmon in Prince
William Sound in 1990, an unprecedented event occurred in the
summer of 1991. The adult salmon returned to the Sound, but instead of returning to their birth streams or hatcheries, the fish
482
Then, during two weeks in
milled and ripened in deep water.
August, millions of pink salmon migrated to the streams and hatch483
This behavior was completely unexpected and overeries.
whelmed the fishing industry’s capacity to catch, transport, and
process the fish. Many of these fish likely had been exposed to oil
484
either in streams in 1989 or in nearshore environments in 1990.
In 1992 and 1993 the pink salmon runs were exceptionally low. The
settlement between the federal and state governments and Exxon,
finalized in October 1991, did not take into account the possibility
of this type of impact on the pink salmon fishery.
c. 1993 First Collapse of the Pacific Herring Fishery.
Within a week of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in March 1989, Pacific
herring and eggs deposited on beaches were exposed to the spreading oil slick in open water and along the shoreline of Prince Wil485
liam Sound. Although egg mortality and larval deformities were
documented, the population-level effect of these injuries was not
clearly established. Suddenly, in 1993, the Pacific herring popula486
tion in the Sound fell dramatically. In that year, Pacific herring
suffered an outbreak of viral hemorrahagic septicemia disease and
fungus, which is thought to have resulted from depressed immune
487
response likely caused by oil exposure. The fish looked horrible,

481. Short et al., supra note 428, at 25. Reports of buried oil from Alaska Natives and fishers prompted these studies of oil persistence. See OTT, supra note 3,
at 361.
482. See OTT, supra note 3, at 258.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 16.
486. Id.
487. OTT, supra note 3, at 265.
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swam around in circles, were covered with lesions, and the females
reabsorbed their eggs.488 The herring population went from a
489
twenty-year high to a twenty-year low.
The fact that all funding was cut for herring research in 1992 is
evidence that this population crash was completely unexpected and
thus an unanticipated effect at the time of the EVOS settlement.
Though there were small harvests in 1997 and 1998, the herring
fisheries have been closed since 1999 to allow the stocks to re490
cover. As a keystone species, the weak state of the herring impacts the entire Prince William Sound ecosystem, as well as the
491
economic health of the human community.

Figure 4. Biomass Estimates of Pacific Herring in Prince William
Sound. Unexploited spawning biomass projected in the year before spawning (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Cordova)
and calculated after spawning (best estimate) using an agestructured assessment model modified by a disease index after
1993.

d. Other Unanticipated Consequences. Since the oil spill,
numerous unforeseen consequences related to the effect of oil on
the marine environment have emerged. These consequences have
488.
489.
490.
491.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 380.
Id.
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led to recognition of new paradigms and calls for innovative practices to assess ecological risks from oil in the oceans.492 Most importantly, before the spill, impacts and risks from oil were believed to
493
be primarily direct and short-term. After the Exxon Valdez spill,
the long-term impacts are apparent, as oil has persisted in startling
494
quantities and as indirect effects have caused significant damage.
Moreover, residual oil has been sufficiently bioavailable to induce
495
long-term impacts to marine species at the population level.
One of the most important paradigm shifts implicated the toxicity of oil and the persistence of its harmful effects. In 1999,
twenty-two polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (“PAHs”) present in
residual oil deposits were identified as persistent, bioaccumulative,
496
and toxic pollutants (a category that includes mercury and PCBs).
Researchers have discovered that oil had previously unknown, per497
sistent, harmful effects to both humans and wildlife. “It now appears the remaining oil deposits may have become a chronic source
498
of low-level oil pollution within the spill-affected area.”
Oil affects the environment on many levels: it can kill marine
organisms, reduce their fitness through sublethal impacts, and dis499
rupt the functioning of marine ecosystems. Again, impacts from
oil on the marine habitat and species were originally believed to be
500
short-term and caused by acute exposure.
In contrast, recent research recognizes both acute and chronic
effects even at low concentrations of oil, as well as impacts at the
population level. A 2003 National Research Council study direly
describes the toxic effects of petroleum hydrocarbons as follows:
“Impairment of behavioral, developmental, and physiological
492. Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082.
493. OTT, supra note 3, at 393.
494. Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082.
495. Id. at 2083.
496. OTT, supra note 3, at 388.
497. Id. For an overview of impacts on human health, see id. at 389–92. PAHs
are persistent in the environment, building up in biological tissues (human and
animal), causing reproductive and developmental harm, central nervous system
problems, cancers, and genetic impacts. Id. at 388–96.
498. NOAA Fisheries, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: How Much Oil Remains?,
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Quarterly/jas2001/feature_jas01.htm (AFSC Quarterly
Research Report 2001) (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
499. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, AND
EFFECTS 120 (2003).
500. Compare NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA 392 (1985) (“[i]t is
important to reemphasize that significant reproductive impairment in oiled field
conditions has seldom been observed”) with NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN
THE SEA III, supra note 499, at 120–21.
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processes may occur at concentrations significantly lower than
acutely toxic levels; such responses may alter the long-term survival
501
Oil is harmful to fish and wildlife at
of affected populations.”
levels 1,000 times lower than those thought in the 1970s to be the
502
toxic thresholds. Recognition of oil’s unforeseen effects has contributed to changes in thinking related to shoreline habitat, oil tox503
icity to marine animals, and oil’s impact on coastal communities.
First, regarding physical shoreline habitat, the old paradigm
held that oil on shores (other than marshes) would be rapidly dispersed, degraded microbially, and “weathered” by ultraviolet light
504
(photolysis). The emerging paradigm suggests that oil degrades
at different rates depending on the environment, and that “subsurface sediments physically protected from disturbance, oxygenation,
505
and photolysis retain[] contamination . . . for years.”
Regarding fish toxicity, the old paradigm held that oil effects
occurred only through short-term (approximately four days) expo506
sure at parts per million concentrations. The emerging paradigm
suggests that fish embryos exposed to parts per billion of weathered oil “will show population impacts through indirect effects on
growth, deformities, and behavior with long-term impacts on mor507
tality and reproduction.”
Regarding marine mammals and seabirds, the old paradigm
held that oil impacts occurred solely through short-term acute exposure and caused death from hypothermia, drowning, or poison508
The emerging paradigm
ing by oil ingestion during preening.
suggests that substantial effects occur over the long term, due to
chronic toxic exposure from contaminated prey, through interactions between environmental stressors and the compromised health
of exposed animals, and through disruption of reproductive behav509
ior in socially organized species.
Finally, regarding coastal communities, the old paradigm held
that significant losses of shoreline plants and invertebrates only occurred through short-term toxic exposure to oil deposited at the
510
shore or shallow seafloor, or via smothering. The new paradigm
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA III, supra note 499, at 125.
OTT, supra note 3, at 413.
Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2085.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reflects an understanding that clean-up efforts may be more damaging than the oil itself, with impacts continuing for the duration of
the clean-up and with indirect impacts that may expand the injury
511
well beyond initial direct losses.
5. Restoration Projects Are Identifiable and Can Be Set Forth
in a Restoration Plan.
a. National Research Council Study and Other Projects.
We believe the first thing the EVOS Trustee Council should do is
hire the National Research Council (“NRC”) to develop a longterm oil spill restoration plan for Prince William Sound. The NRC
can bring to bear top scientific expertise and spell out the particulars needed for a Reopener Restoration Plan (as required by the
settlement).
There is no shortage of ideas the NRC could be asked to review. The EVOS Trustee Council has completed hundreds of studies assessing and monitoring the recovery of species and ecosystems
512
The Council should hire the NRC to
of Prince William Sound.
evaluate the Sound’s situation, review the studies to date, and help
formulate a restoration plan. NRC can develop an informed opinion about the effectiveness of projects undertaken and what actions
should be continued, in addition to contributing new ideas.
The NRC should also be asked to comment on the vast number of species that have not been priorities of the Council. The
Council’s Summary of Restoration Strategies and Projects lists only
513
Due to the interconnectedness of marine
twenty-two species.
ecosystems, a broader look by the NRC would be appropriate.
The NRC is often called the “Supreme Court of Science,” and
it has completed studies on thousands of complex scientific topics
since its establishment in Abraham Lincoln’s administration. It
borders on the bizarre for the EVOS Trustee Council to choose the
Integral Corporation over the NRC for its swan-song studies. This
confirms suspicions that the EVOS Trustee Council underestimates
the remaining work.
In a January 2002 letter to Governor Knowles, Exxon’s Chief
Executive Officer said he was “troubled” by the suggestion that
there were grounds for invoking the Reopener, because he did not
see any restoration projects that had not been implemented for

511. Id.
512. E.g., EVOS Trustee Council, Summary of Strategies and Projects 2003,
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/restoration/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
513. Id. (also listing human services such as “passive use” and “subsistence”).
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lack of funding; in fact, there was (and still is) a cash reserve.514 In
the letter, Exxon advanced two ideas: (1) all the environment needs
is a few good projects of limited scope, duration, and cost; and (2)
the EVOS Council is an efficient and effective means of fulfilling
the NRD mandate of the Clean Water Act (to restore, rehabilitate,
or acquire the equivalent) and completing those projects. Taking
the company at its word, there are a number of possible roads to be
pursued; the cash reserve and additional funds could quickly be put
to use.
Alaska citizens have ideas. For instance, Rick Steiner of the
515
Coastal Coalition has urged a herring buy-back program. Buying
all commercial herring fishing permits would boost the herring
516
population by preventing depopulation. Even at pre-spill prices,
the Coastal Coalition estimates that the permits could be purchased
517
for a total cost of $30 million. The price of a permit has dropped
518
from around $300,000 to $28,000 since the spill; fishers could reasonably be expected to accept the offer, and the purchase costs
might be even lower than this estimate.
Another viable project would be to identify marine protected
areas and establish a system to monitor them; all that would need
to be acquired is an administrative infrastructure—boats, and the
people to run them. Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”) or marine
reserves (“no-take” areas) are increasingly recognized as effective
519
management tools to preserve and restore marine resources. Potential benefits of marine reserves include: enhancing reproductive
potential of marine species, maintaining species diversity, preserv520
ing habitat and ecosystem function, and supporting fisheries. Marine reserves benefit not only the ecosystem within them but also
521
Studies demongenerate a spillover effect into adjacent areas.
strate that the size and abundance of exploited species increase in

514. Letter from L.R. Raymond, Chairman & CEO, Exxon Mobil Corp., to
Gov. Tony Knowles, State of Alaska (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with author).
515. Gay, supra note 162, at B1.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later, supra note 249.
519. E.g., STEPHEN R. PALUMBI, PEW OCEANS COMM’N, MARINE RESERVES: A
TOOL FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION (2002),
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/pew_oceans_marine_reserves.pdf.
520. See Lydia K. Bergen & Mark H. Carr, Establishing Marine Reserves: How
Can Science Best Inform Policy?, ENV’T, Mar. 2003, at 8, 10–11.
521. Id. at 11.
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areas adjacent to marine reserves, and other evidence demonstrates
that reserves also replenish larger regional populations.522
MPAs and marine reserves could be used as restoration projects to assess recovery from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, as well as
to limit ongoing damage from human impacts. These are flexible
options that can be tailored to the desired restoration goal. For
instance, no-take marine reserves could be designated as permitonly scientific research. MPAs could be designated to permit only
subsistence use. MPAs could be designated in state waters (within
three miles of the coastline) and managed by the state and Alaska
Native organizations. An ecosystem management approach could
also be implemented, via designation of MPAs or marine reserves
in conjunction with terrestrial protected areas.
b. A Perpetual “Stewardship” for Alaska Natives. The
EVOS Trustee Council could be replaced by a Perpetual Stewardship Council, in which Alaska Natives would have a strong voice.
The Natives were hardest hit and least represented in the frantic
523
response to the spill. They will live with the consequences for the
foreseeable future. “They promised us that when they left they
would leave it as clean as before the oil hit,” says Gail Evanoff,
524
now the village president of Chenega Bay. “I’m sorry, but those
are extremely dirty beaches out there, and life continues to die be525
cause of that oil on the beaches.”
Reopener funds could make it possible for the Natives to do
for themselves what no promises have done for them. An ongoing
administrative structure is necessary to carry restoration into the
future. Some entity will have to oversee continuation of the EVOS
studies, establishment of marine preserves, distribution of buy-back
monies (if that is undertaken), and new duties of monitoring, oversight, and restoration.
Over the years, the Natives have fought furiously (to little
avail) for a stronger voice on the EVOS Trustee Council. A 2004
paper by the Chugach Regional Resources Commission insists
there have been no studies on the “impacts of this technological

522. PALUMBI, supra note 519, at 27. Replenishment occurs both through spillover of adults or juveniles out of reserves, as well as through the export of larvae
or eggs that drift from the reserve to adjacent areas. Id.
523. The Chenega Bay Native community, whose name is embedded in the
legal fallout of the oil spill, has seen its population plummet to forty-two—less
than half the pre-spill number. See George Lewis, Alaska Lives with an Unwanted
Legacy, MSNBC, Mar. 24, 1999, http://msnbc.com/news/252495.
524. Id.
525. Id.
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disaster to the Tribes and Native Communities from their perspective.”526 Disruption was enormous at the outset (harvest losses in
527
the first year following the spill were up to 77%) and the injury
has not healed. Community involvement was not a successful pro528
gram from the Native point of view. In 1999, the Council adopted
a “recovery objective” for subsistence (that was not met then and
has not been met now):
Subsistence will have recovered when injured resources used for
subsistence are healthy and productive and exist at prespill levels. In addition, there is recognition that people must be confident that the resources are safe to eat and that the cultural values provided by gathering, preparing, and sharing food need to
529
be reintegrated into community life.

The Gulf Ecosystem Monitoring (“GEM”) program is the
530
Native
wind-down project for the EVOS Trustee Council.
“community involvement” has wound down with it. This lapse was
identified in a review of GEM by the National Research Council,
which recommended strengthening “community involvement” in
531
the way it is understood by the Natives. This recommendation of
a prestigious science advisory committee, in turn, is viewed as a
“window of opportunity for the tribes to pursue their idea of establishing their endowment titled Tribal Ecosystem Stewardship Pro532
gram.” This tribal endowment has been formalized as follows:
The 20 communities affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill are
proposing that the EVOS Trustee Council establish an endowment of $20 million to ensure meaningful Tribal and community
involvement in the GEM research and monitoring projects and
programs. Such an endowment will assist in promoting community-based scientific research and monitoring of the traditional
natural resources on a continuous long term basis. This program
will also serve as a forum for western science to gain valuable
traditional ecological knowledge about the resources, and for the
community members to learn more about the language and in-

526. Id. at 1.
527. See id. at 4 (citing JAMES A. FALL, SUBSISTENCE USES OF FISH AND
WILDLIFE BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL (1996)); see also
LEE STRATTON, RESOURCE HARVEST AND USE IN TATITLEK, ALASKA (Alaska
Dep’t of Fish & Game Technical Paper No. 181, 1990) (a fortuitous “baseline”
paper discussing pre-spill (1988) use of 75 kinds of resources in Tatitlek, a town
four miles from “ground zero” on Bligh Reef).
528. See Brown-Schwalenberg, supra note 141, at 8–17.
529. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 27.
530. See Brown-Schwalenberg, supra note 141, at 14–16 (describing GEM).
531. Id. at 17–18 (describing the Committee to Review the Gulf of Alaska Ecosystem Monitoring program (“ROGEM”)).
532. Id. at 18.
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tent of science and to receive certified technical533on-the-job training in natural resource stewardship techniques.

The recommendation for a Perpetual Stewardship Council for
Alaska Natives is not some impossible dream. The institution of
NRD trustees is a work in progress. The EVOS Trustee Council
was not prescribed by hard law in the halls of Congress; it was—
figuratively at least—made up in settlement negotiations and made
real by incorporation into the 1991 settlement. This same kind of
creative reality must be pursued into the future of Prince William
Sound.
IV. CONCLUSION
We believe the case for the Reopener is made. We hope the
responsible governments for the State of Alaska and the United
States ask the court to order Exxon to pay $100 million. Failing
that, we urge Native entities to intervene in the case and seek enforcement of the Reopener. Whether it arrives by court order or
future settlement, we foresee a future for Prince William Sound
made better by the resources that were legally committed to that
purpose.

533. Chugach Regional Res. Comm’n, Tribal Ecosystem Stewardship Program:
An Endowment for Tribal Involvement in the GEM Program (undated proposal,
on file with author).

